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GERMAN POLITICKS,
OR, THE
MODERN SYSTEM
EXAMINED and REFUTED;

German Politics

WHEREIN

The Natural Strength of GERMANY
and FRANCE are compared;

The Nature of the BALLANCE of POWER
explained;

And our Inability to maintain, in our present
Circumstances, a War on the Continent, is
demonstrated.

To which is Added, A

P O S T S C R I P T.

Britannia servitutem suam quotidie emit, quotidie poscit.
Tacit. in vita Agricolaë.

THE SECOND EDITION.

L O N D O N :

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MODERN SYSTEM



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T O S T B O R I T

Printed by J. G. & J. W. Smith, 10, Abchurch Lane, London, E.C. 4.

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T H E
P R E F A C E.

*W*HEN this Pamphlet was first published, those who disliked it, treated all that was predicted therein, as to the future Conduct of the Germans, in the Light of improbable Conjectures, or of malicious Suggestions. But Time, the true Test of Politicks, has justified every Thing the Reader will find in the following Sheets advanced; from whence it will appear how easy a Thing it was, even for Politicians without Places or Pen-

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sions, to foresee the Turn that Affairs would take, and the Necessity there was of not straining Things high, merely to oblige a particular Court. But what such disinterested and uncharactered People discoursed on such Subjects went for nothing; the same Scheme of Politicks was pursued, and while we gloried in placing a new Emperor on the Throne of Germany; France, in her Turn, made a fair Push for placing a Viceroy here.

This was surely the strongest Evidence that could be desired of our playing too high a Game, and risking more than we could afford. Such as are truly loyal to the present Government, and have a just Sense of the Blessings we owe to our present happy Establishment, must be satisfied, that in risking that, we not only did more than could be expected from us; but even more than we can justify to ourselves, or to our Posterity. For I crave leave to say,
and



and I believe there is no Englishman will think I carry the Matter too far in so saying, that the Laws, Liberties and Properties of this Nation, ought not to be put in Jeopardy from any Consideration whatever, let it regard whom it would. This is and was always reasonable ; this every true Patriot, every honest well-meaning Briton, knew and thought before he had the Light of Experience to guide him ; and I dare say, is sincerely sorry to see his Opinion justified at so high a Price to his Country, as the Rebellion first and last has cost.

But it may be said, that though this was foreseen it could not be avoided. To which I answer, it might. Once it was in our Power, and we neglected it. Afterwards we put it in the Power of our Allies, and they let it slip ; which is the less wonderful, since no true Politician, could ever expect that any other Power should pay a greater Attention

tion to the Interests of this Nation, than she thought fit to do to her own. But that I may not be charged with talking mysteriously, or confining myself to general Terms, I will explain what I mean, as I think an honest Man ought to do, and one who has nothing but the Interest of his Country in view, has a right to do.

In few Words then, my Meaning is this. We had it in our own Power, and to secure the Interest of the British Nation, so long ago, as when the late Emperor offered to make Peace upon our own Terms. If that Offer had been of no Consequence, why was he invited to Francfort, why treated with at all? If it was of Consequence, and if a good Peace might have been made at that Time, why was it not made? This is a Question that concerns us nearly: For if a Peace had been then made, most certain it is, that the Rebellion had never happen'd, the Publick Credit of the Nation had never been affected;

ed; nor had we, or our necessary Allies the Dutch, been in the Circumstances, which we find ourselves in at this Day.

The other Opportunity I mentioned, was on concluding the Convention of Hanover with the King of Prussia. If the Empress Queen of Hungary had closed with it immediately, and not waited for those Events which forced her to close with it at last, by the Treaty lately concluded at Dresden; many Things must have happened, which would have put our Affairs, her Affairs, and the Affairs of all the Allies, in a Situation very different from that which they are now in. In the first Place, the French King durst neither have supported, nor have avowed, the Cause of the Rebels. In the next, the Spaniards and their Allies had never prevailed, as they have in Italy. And lastly, not to tire the Reader with Particulars, there had been at this Hour, such an Army
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in the Low-Countries, as would at least have prevented the French from making any farther Conquests, perhaps inclined them to have parted with those they made last Campaign. But German Politicks prevented this; and the plain Inference is, that for this Reason we ought to grow wise at last, and trust to British, not German, Politicks for the future.





GERMAN POLITICKS.

TH E R E are certain Seasons when not to be Serious, is not to be Sensible ; not to consider Publick Affairs, is to be inexcusably Careless and Indolent ; and not to follow the Lights we receive, is to be Pusillanimous and Dishonest. Such a Season I take the present to be ; we have already raised as many Taxes as well can be raised, which I prove from the Mortgaging the Sinking Fund ; that can be justified from no other Cause. We are in Debt as much as we well can be, as is evident from our parting with the very Equity of Redemption, and taking up upon that, which was designed for paying off our old Scores. We are in Difficulties enough with one War, and yet are threatned with much greater, in Case, under our present Circumstances, we should venture upon another. Such is our Condition, and therefore if ever we are to think, if ever we are to employ our Understandings, if ever we are to act like wise Men, or to behave like People that know what they are about, this is the Time. If we sleep now, we had as good never wake ; if we do not exert ourselves at this Crisis, we may, indeed, have time enough for Repentance, but the Season of Amendment will be passed ; we may deplore our past Conduct, but that will not recall it ; we may weep for our Folly, but we shall never be comforted ; the

Staff will be out of our Hands, and we shall find ourselves, where many foolish Nations have been found before, in the Gulph of Political Despair.

As a Man must be arrived at a very hardened State, who does not tremble at the Apprehension of seeing his Country in such a Situation, so I think we can never pay too great a Tribute of Praise to our present Governors, who have left it in the Power of every Man to speak his Sentiments freely in such a Juncture, and have chosen rather to bear indecent Reflections upon themselves, than in the midst of so many, and so great, Dangers to curb the Liberty of the Press, by which alone we can hope to be quickened to a proper Sense of our Condition. I know there are some who give another Turn to this, but for my Part, as I am conscious of no other Motive, to the using this Liberty, than the Desire I have of acquitting myself to my Country, so I shall always esteem it the highest Act of Injustice to ascribe that to a wrong Principle, which seems to flow more naturally from a right one; and under a just Sense of this, I presume our great Men shew so much Indulgence to the Press, and I shall use it in that way, and with all the Freedom, which can be expected, from one who knows no Party, owns no Patron but the Publick, who has been for many Years a studious Observer of what pass on the great Theatre of the World, and who was never in so much Pain about any Transaction he beheld thereon, as he is at present.

There is undoubtedly in private Life no Character more unworthy of Love, more justly or more generally punished with Hate, than Selfishness, and yet somewhat of this Nature is absolutely necessary to preserve a Power of being otherwise; he who is careless of his own Concerns, will



will soon have it out of his Power to relieve, how much Feeling soever he may have for the Wants of others. It is the same Thing with Nations, if they Regard nothing but their own Interest, they will necessarily become Hateful and Hated, they will provoke the Envy of their Neighbours, and their own Conduct will afford such Colours for attacking and destroying them, as will give a Shew of Justice even to the Work of Malice. This was the Case of the *Cartbaginians*, they were Selfish to the last Degree, and this made them most assiduous in their Commerce, this again made them Rich, when they were so they grew Proud and Insolent, which naturally brought on them Difficulties, Distresses, and in the end Destruction. But though Selfishness be so bad an Ingredient in Policy, when it is there in too great a Degree, yet we must take Care not to leave it totally out; a Nation prodigal in supporting others, and vainly fond of having fine Things said to her by her Neighbours, may be led into such Expences, as it is out of her Power to support, may even in a just Cause be drawn to Ruin by Profusion, and be undone herself by a preposterous Desire of saving Others. This was the Case of *Sweden* under *Charles XII.* He was not content with repressing Acts of Hostility against his own Kingdom, he would needs be the Protector of distressed Princes, and the Saviour of enslaved Nations; nay, at last he extended his Care of Mankind so far as to set up like another *Hercules* for the pulling down of Tyrants; but his first Expedition, in that way, proved his last, his generous Enthusiasm undid him, and which was worse still undid his Subjects.

We see therefore, that Moderation is alike necessary in all Things, and that it is a Rule in Policy, as well as Prudence, not to be Righteous

overmuch, that is, not to be madly and fantastically desirous of obtaining all the World's good Word, and being so perfectly disinterested out of a Thirst of Praise, as to forgo that Profit, which is necessary for our own Preservation. It is just, it is laudable, to have a hearty Concern for the Welfare of our Neighbours, but the very Reason that convinces us of this, convinces us much more strongly, that it is not either just or laudable to be negligent of our selves. Yet so it is, that while Christianity seems, and I am very sorry to say it, to have but little Influence over the Conduct of Individuals, its Maxims, over-strained, seem to be the Rudiments of Modern Politicks; for otherwise, how should it come to pass, that in Order to be thought true *Britons*, and good Subjects, we are enjoined, over and above our Affection for our King and Country, to love certain Neighbours of ours, not only as well, but better than ourselves. Charity is most certainly an excellent Thing, but even with Respect to that, there is an old Proverb, and a true one, that *Charity begins at Home*. If I am ill of a Fever, my Neighbour has no right to expect that I should go to see him, because he has got a Cold, much less, that I should send him my Apothecary and Physician, and pay those he thinks fit to call, when I have infinitely more need of Medicines than He. If a Man is weak enough to call this Charity, I don't doubt but he may find Neighbours wise enough to sooth him in his Folly, and to keep him running about, as long as he has Strength to stand upon his Legs; but I know what his Family will think all the while; and I know that the Case is much the same, if transferred from a Man to a Nation.

We

We have for a Century last past, been extremely puzzled, as to the proper Rule of our Behaviour, towards a certain Thing called the Ballance of *Europe*; sometimes risking all for its Service has been esteemed the highest Point of Heroism, at other Times it has been regarded as downright Knight-Errantry; and as the opposite Parties prevailed, Men have been admired and laughed at by turns, for their Attachment to, or Contempt of this Principle. Nay at this very Hour, some are wise Men and Fools, Saints and Devils, Patriots and Traytors, in different Companies, merely as People's Notions vary, about the Importance of this same Ballance of Power. Of late Years indeed our Notions have grown narrower in this, as in most other Respects, and instead of the Ballance of Power in *Europe*, we have chiefly confined our Cares to the Ballance of Power in *Germany*. If this has been preserved, all in the Opinion of our most knowing People, went well, but if ever it tottered, or through our being at so great a Distance, if we but apprehended it to totter, then were we to run one and all to set it strait, to shift the Weights in the several Scales, 'till we thought it stood even, and upon this perhaps some of our Neighbours, who were nearer, thought it awry, and then to tugging went they, which brought us into the Scrape again. Thus we have gone on, and thus we are like to go on, to the no small Sorrow of some, who think we are quite mistaken in our Notions about this Matter, and that if we do not speedily discover our Mistake, we may bring ourselves into such a Condition, as may render all Discoveries too late.

I know the Risk a Man runs of being thought a Tory, a Jacobite, or an Incendiary, for talking at this Rate; but I know that a Man must always
risk

risk something who will defend the Truth, and therefore I give myself no great Concern about what People may call me, in Consequence of my Writing this Pamphlet. I have studied this Point with Labour and Diligence, and I am fully satisfied, I can set it in a true Light, that is to say, I can point out that middle Path, that Road of Moderation, in which we ought to tread, if we have any Regard for ourselves, as well as for the *Germans*; by treading in which we may save ourselves, and do them good at the same Time, and out of which if we are once carried by any sort of Political Enthusiasm, we shall be certainly undone, and then who will take Care of the Ballance of Power in *Germany*, who will be solicitous for the Safety of lower *Saxony*, who will be Protectors of the *Land* of the *Eleët*, when we are gone? Let them think of this who take no care of us; let them who have such Tendernefs for our half Brethren, have some Bowels for those of the whole Blood; let Common-Sense supply the Place of Natural Affection, and if not to Prudence, let us owe our Safety to Cunning at least. Now to make all this evident, and to leave no *Englishman* who will take the pains to consider, and who has Sense enough to understand a Thing of this Nature when he has considered it, the very least Reason to doubt about it, I shall proceed to examine the Three following Points.

First, I shall consider the Ancient State of *Germany*, what was heretofore understood by the Ballance of Power in that Part of *Europe*, and the Concern their Neighbours had for it. The Power that the *German* Princes had in those early Days, the Uses they made of it, and in Consequence thereof the Figure they made, and the Rank they stood in, with Regard to the other Powers

Powers of *Europe*, but particularly with Regard to *England*.

Secondly, I shall apply myself to the Examination of the present State of *Germany*, with Regard to the same Points, more especially the Balance of Power there; the Grandeur of the *Imperial* and *Electoral* Dignities; the Capacity of the *Germanic* Body to resist, or if they find it necessary to reduce the Power of *France*; and the Relation which in its present Circumstances that Country has, or may be supposed to have to *Britain*.

Lastly, I shall take Notice of the ancient and present Circumstances of the Inhabitants of this Island, as well in Regard to their Properties and Commerce, as to their Interest in Respect to their Concerns on the Continent, and that great Concern of all the Ballance of Power in *Europe*; with some Thoughts as to what it has cost us, what it may cost us, and what at this Juncture we may be able to expend about it.

Cluverius, who has written with great Learning and Judgment the History of the ancient *Germans*, has very fully shewn, that, all Circumstances considered, the Nation inhabiting this vast Tract of Country, made a greater Figure in those early Days, than she does now, having frequently extended her Conquests on every side, and Peopling by this means most of the Northern and Western Parts of *Europe*. The ancient *Germans* were, as all Writers agree, a Generous, Brave and Gallant People, passionately fond of Liberty, and who were content to be free, in a very indifferent Country, rather than risk being Slaves, by submitting themselves so absolutely to the Will and Direction of a single Person, as was requisite in order to conquer a better. In Process of Time
their

their Manners and their Form of Government altered, and which is a little extraordinary it has now and then reverted to its first Principles. For Instance, the Original Government of the *German Nations*, like the Original Government of our own Island, was by petty Princes who governed their little Sovereignities, not at Will, but according to a Scheme of Laws, sanctified by common Consent, with an Occasional Dependence, on a supreme Chief, or great Commander, who in Times of Difficulty was chosen to a Sort of Dictatorship. *Charles* the Great, and the Emperors his Successors, were however Princes of another Sort, for they possessed a Kind of absolute Dominion ; but finding it necessary to appoint several Officers, some for executing Justice, and others for directing Military Affairs ; and disposing of these as they thought convenient, in the several Provinces of their Empire, these Officers by Degrees enlarged their Power, transmitted it to their Descendants, and established again, in a great measure, that very Kind of Government, which at first prevailed.

As Powerful as these ancient Emperors were, and as much as they were inclined to assume to themselves the Prerogatives of the *Roman Monarchs*, whom they pretended to succeed, yet they were not able to give Law to their Neighbours, notwithstanding the vast Extent of Territory they possessed, and the great military Power, which they had always in their Hands. *Charles* the Great, who was Master of *Germany, France, Italy* and Part of *Spain*, made a League with the *Scots* ; and when he attempted to prescribe Bounds to one of our *Saxon* Princes, he treated that Interposition with Contempt, and the Emperor was afterwards glad to court his Friendship. When
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the Empire became Elective, it was an Honour to which Princes of all Countries aspired, and amongst the rest the *English*. *Richard* Duke of *Cornwall*, Son to King *John*, and Brother to *Henry* III. was crowned Emperor at *Aix la Chapelle*, on the 2d of *May*, 1257, and this Piece of Vanity cost the Nation immense Sums of Money, of which when the *Germans* had got all they could, they fairly turn'd him out; and having likewise drained considerable Sums from *Alphonso*, surnamed the wise King of *Castile*, they set up *Rodolph* Count of *Hapsburgh*, from whom the House of *Austria* are descended. He was succeeded by *Adolphus* Count of *Nassau*, who was opposed by *Albert* Son to the late Emperor, and we took Part in the Quarrel; *Adolphus* served in our Army against the *French*, and at that Time we were weak enough to put our selves to a vast Expence, to enable that Emperor to recover the Kingdom of *Arles*: For this Purpose we sent over to the Emperor *Adolph*, a vast Sum of Money, to raise Troops for the Support of the common Cause, which he employed in the Purchase of *Thuringia*, for his Family; and *Albert* of *Austria* taking Advantage of this wrong Step, and being powerfully supported by *France*, attacked, defeated and killed the Emperor *Adolph*. On the Death of *Lewis* of *Bavaria*, the Electors chose *Edward* III. King of *England*, but he was too wise a Prince to be cheated by the Shadow of a Sovereignty, or to run into any Expences about it; and therefore he wisely declined accepting this Offer, that he might not embarrass himself, or exhaust his Subjects. Throughout this Period of Time, the Policy of the *German* Princes, was plainly directed to the single Point of making the most of the Imperial Diadem, by offering it to such foreign

Princes as were remarkable for their Ambition and Wealth; and as soon as they had extracted as much from them as they could, they always found some Pretence or other for setting up a Countryman of their own, under whose Protection they might enjoy the Riches derived to them, in this Manner, from other Nations; until such Time as the House of *Austria* became so powerful, as to put an end to these Sort of Practices, by assuming a new Kind of Influence, which though it left the Appearance of Election, secured an Hereditary Descent of the Imperial Dignity in their Family.

I am very far from blaming this Disposition in the *German* Princes, because it was founded on a Spirit of true Patriotism, by which they converted all Things to the Service of their Country; in which they sought, by all the Methods possible, to fix the Power and Riches of *Europe*: A Principle from which they have never hitherto varied, farther than the Vicissitudes natural to sublunary Things have rendered it necessary; and in these Variations, they have shewn such Prudence, such Firmness, and such Warmth of publick Spirit, as not not only extremely commendable, but worthy also of Imitation; that is, not to Disguise my Thoughts, it ought to put other Nations on acting upon the like Principles, that they may preserve and promote their own Happiness. It was from this Motive, that in the thirteenth Century, several free Cities in *Germany*, by leaguuing themselves together, created that surprizing Republick, intituled the *Teutonic Hanse*, by which they engrossed all the Trade of *Europe*, for above two hundred Years, to themselves. It is indeed a great pity that we have not a clear and distinct History of this wonderful Association, which does more Honour to
Commerce,

Commerce, than any Thing we met with either in Ancient or Modern History ; the Power, Influence and Riches of *Tyre, Carthage, Venice, Genoa, and Holland* not excepted. By the prudent Regulations of the *German Hanse Towns*, they not only secured all the Trade of their own Country to themselves, and managed that of the *North*, without Rivals, but they likewise associated Foreign Cities so as to have the Direction of Trade every where, but particularly here, where their Privileges were so extensive, that it was with great Difficulty the Natives broke through them ; and nothing but the Spirit of *Henry VIII.* and the Wisdom of some Counsellors about his Son *Edward VI.* could have delivered us from their Oppression, or opened a Passage for the *English* Traders, to export their own Commodities and Manufactures, or import those of foreign Countries freely, without paying such exorbitant Tribute, to these *German* Monopolizers, as was absolutely inconsistent with our Interest as a free People, and a trading Nation. Such as are curious may apply themselves for Information to *Strype's* Memorials, *Hollingshead*, and other Writers, who have recorded, though very imperfectly, the Struggles of our Ancestors upon this Subject. From hence it clearly appears how deep Reach the *Germans* have always had, and now zealously they have bent their Endeavours to aggrandize themselves at the Expence of other Nations, and to bind them by Treaties, Alliances, Charters, and every other possible Method, to sacrifice their own natural Interest, to their Friendship for the *German* People. In the Reign of *Queen Elizabeth*, the Power of the *Hanse Towns* was upon the decline, and yet their Spirit remained unbroken ; they saw, and took Advantage of

her Difficulties, they assisted the *Spaniards* against her, by every Method they could devise, by furnishing them with Provisions, Artillery, Ammunition, Transports, and even Ships of War, at the same Time, that under Pretence of there being no War between *England* and the *Empire*, they would have protected their Subjects and Vessels, as if they had belonged to a Neutral State. But that wise Princess was not to be terrified or cheated; she bore with these Grievances at first, 'till by the Exercise of a Naval War, she had raised a considerable Maritime Power, and then she treated those People as they deserved, ordering her Admirals to sink, burn, and take all such Vessels belonging to the *Hanse Towns*, as they should find in the Service of the King of *Spain*, or his Subjects; and they executed this with such Vigour and Activity, as soon put it out of the Power of the *Hanse Towns* to shew their Malice towards her Government, by any other Methods than grumbling, complaining, and exciting the States of the *Empire* against her, which gave that Queen an Opportunity of extinguishing all their Privileges here, and of engaging most of the *German Merchants* settled in her Dominions, to enter into the *English Companies of Commerce*, which she erected, and which gave the last Blow to *German Tyranny*, and effectually established our own Navigation.

The Power of the House of *Austria* came to its Height under *Charles V.* who was at the same time King of *Spain*, Sovereign of great Part of *Italy*, and all the Low Countries. The Conduct of this Prince, changed the whole System of *Germany*; for as he had nothing at Heart but the Grandeur of his Family, which led him to Measures directly repugnant to the Interest of the Empire,

Empire, so the *German* Princes grew extremely uneasy at the extravagant Growth of his Power, as well as at the ill Use, they thought, he made of it. The Religious Disturbances that then broke out, afforded Pretences for both Parties to associate and arm themselves, for the Defence of their respective Causes. The Protestants entered into a defensive Alliance at *Smalkald*, which in the Year 1535 was renewed, and had then so formidable an Appearance, that the Emperor could not forbear testifying his Resolution to dissolve it. The Protestants, under *John Frederick* Elector of *Saxony*, and *Philip* Landgrave of *Hesse*, immediately took the Field with 100,000 Men, and if they had attacked the Emperor with the same Expedition, they had, in all Probability, effectually secured both their civil and ecclesiastical Liberties, against the arbitrary Designs of that tyrannical and fraudulent Prince. But their Slowness gave him Time, not only to raise a puissant Army, but to create a dangerous Diversion, by the Help of *Maurice* of *Saxony*, Cousin to the Elector; so that the next Year, the Emperor beat the last-mentioned Prince, in a decisive Battle, near *Muhlberg*, and took him Prisoner; proceeding afterwards with such Severity, as to pass on him Sentence of Death; and the Landgrave of *Hesse*, having submitted himself upon the Emperor's Faith, was in Breach of it, put in Prison.

This Defeat of the Protestants, gave the Emperor the Opportunity he wanted, of securing the Possessions of his Family, at the Expence of the *German* Interest; for in the Year 1548 he engaged or rather forced the States of the Empire, to take upon them the Guaranty of the Circle of *Burgundy*, which comprehended not only the Dutchy and County of that Name, but also all the

Low

Low Countries ; involving the Empire, thereby, in all the Disputes that afterwards happened between the *Spanish* Branch of his Family, and the *French*, about those Provinces, with which they would otherwise have had nothing to do. And in Virtue of this Guaranty, it is that Colonel *Mentzel*, in his late Manifesto, threatens to detach from the *French* Monarchy the *Franche-Comte*, and the Dutchy of *Burgundy*, as having been dismembered from the Empire ; though the Reader will observe, that the placing them under the Protection of the Empire, was in Effect, a Force upon the States, and brought about entirely by the Policy and Puissance of this mighty Prince, who therein considered the Safety of his own Family, rather than the Interest of the *Germanic* Body. But as all great Oppressions of a Nation, naturally powerful, have a direct Tendency to excite their own Redress, by stirring up great Men to those Remedies, which the Nature of the Case shew can alone prove successful ; so the *German* Princes, and especially the Protestants, finding themselves in Circumstances so uneasy, and fearing that the Emperor would proceed to still greater Lengths, resolved to have recourse once more to Arms. In this Enterprize they had for their Chief, that very *Maurice* Elector of *Saxony*, who became so by the Favour of the Emperor, in Prejudice of his Cousin the Elector *John Frederick* ; and as *Maurice* saw the mischievous Consequences of the dilatory Conduct of the Allies of *Smalkald*, he took his Measures so secretly and successfully, that he very narrowly missed seizing the Emperor at *Inspruck*, from whence he fled away by Torch-Light. This Blow had a terrible Effect upon the Emperor's Affairs, who found himself obliged to compromise Matters with the Protestants, by the Treaty

ty of *Passau*: In this Dispute the Confederates made use of the Assistance of *Henry* the Second of *France*, but as they took no Care of his Interest, in making this Peace, he seized *Metz*, *Toul* and *Verdun*, which the *French* have kept ever since; and for the Recovery of which, Colonel *Mentzel* declares in his Manifesto, that the Allies were advancing towards the Frontiers of *France*; thus the Reader perceives that the *German* Empire suffered this great Diminution of Power and Territory from the exorbitant Ambition of the House of *Austria*.

The Affairs of *Germany* during the Reigns of the succeeding Emperors, *Ferdinand*, *Maximilian*, and *Rodolph*, went smoothly enough; for the House of *Austria* being now parted into two Branches, the *Germans* were the better satisfied with the Imperial Line. But the Emperor *Matthias*, a bold, enterprising and ambitious Prince, and withal a great Enemy to the Protestants, took such Measures, as made the Wounds of *Germany* break out a-fresh, in the famous War of thirty Years, waged chiefly by the *Calvinists*, or, as they are stiled in *Germany*, the Reformed, at the Head of whom were the Elector *Palatine*, and the Landgrave of *Hesse-Cassel*, who framed a new League, and intitled it the *Evangelical Union*. In the beginning of these Disturbances the Emperor died; and the *Bohemians* rejecting his Nephew *Ferdinand* II. who succeeded him in the Empire, chose *Frederick*. Elector *Palatine*, for their King, who married the Daughter of our *James* I. who spent a great deal of Money, though to very little Purpose, for the Service of his Son-in-Law; and is very unaccountably blamed, by most of our Historians, for not running headlong into a War, with which he had very little, if any thing to do. The Emperor's

peror's Success was so great, and his Moderation so little, that it alarmed many of the Princes of the Empire, who had no Share in the Beginning of the Troubles, in Consequence of which, the Princes and States of lower *Saxony*, thought fit to elect *Christian IV.* King of *Denmark* their General ; to whom our *Charles I.* sent a large Sum of Money, for the Support of the Protestant Cause : He was soon beat by the Emperor's General Count *Tilly* ; and this fresh Success raised the Emperor's Spirits to such a Degree, that he began to oppress the Protestants every where, and brought them into the lowest Distress ; which induced them in an Assembly at *Leipsick*, to call in the famous *Gustavus Adolphus*, King of *Sweden*, to their Assistance ; thus that great War, which cost the *Germans* so dear, took rise entirely from the overbearing and tyrannical Temper of the Emperors of the House of *Austria*. This War continued during the Reign of *Ferdinand III.* and after the Death of the King of *Sweden* ; 'till in the End, the Emperor was so much weakened, and his hereditary Countries exhausted to so great a Degree, that he found himself under an absolute Necessity of making Peace, which he did at *Munster* in 1648.

By this Treaty, or rather by that of *Osnaburgh*, which was a Kind of Preliminary to that of *Munster*, the King of *Sweden* had the best Part of *Pomerania*, the Archbishoprick of *Bremen*, the Bishoprick of *Verden* and other Places yielded to him ; and the Archbishoprick of *Halberstadt*, the Principality of *Minden*, the County of *Holstein*, and the Archbishoprick of *Magdebourg* were given up to the King of *Denmark* ; the lower *Palatinate* was restored to the Elector of that Name ; *Metz*, *Toul* and *Verdun* were yielded to the

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You see that all this was done without the Intervention of *England*, or without our getting or losing any thing thereby ; though at the Beginning of the Quarrel, we had interposed in Favour of the *German* Princes, and in Conjunction with the Northern Kings. You see likewise how *France* acquired her first Footing in *Alsace*, and the Possession of several Places, which Colonel *Mentzel* says are shortly to be taken from her ; in fine, you will observe, that by this very Treaty, all the Conquests hitherto made by *France*, are given up, and yielded to her, in the strongest Terms, by a Treaty, upon which the present Constitution of *Germany*, the Rights, Privileges and Possessions of all the Princes and States therein are absolutely founded. A Treaty ratified and confirmed by many subsequent, I may say by all subsequent Treaties, and which if it should be overturned, by reclaiming all that is given to *France* thereby, must necessarily induce new Disturbances in *Germany*, perhaps more dangerous in their Consequences, than any that have followed upon the Disputes about the *Pragmatic Sanction*. These I say are Things you discover at first Sight, from the bare Detail of what has formerly happened in this Country, and which cannot be denied by any who are competently versed in Modern History, and who are content to make use of their Knowledge, for the Support of Truth, rather than the Maintainance of their own Prejudices.

Thenceforward the Affairs of *Germany* acquired a new Face ; the Electors and Princes considered the *French* King as their sole Support, and the Emperor continued notwithstanding to pursue his old Scheme of treating them as his Subjects ; this occasioned perpetual Disputes and Quarrels in the Empire, and afforded the *French* King, I mean
Lewis

Lewis XIV. the most ambitious and withal the most able Monarch of his Time, to take such Advantages of the Distractions of the Empire, as have given rise to all the Doubts and Fears, that have terrified the Friends to the Ballance of Power in *Europe* ever since. *Lewis* knew how sometimes to deceive the Emperor, and at others to cheat the several Princes of the Empire, into Treaties, visibly injurious to the common Interests of *Germany*, by pretending to support them from Time to Time, in their private Views, either by Money or Troops. Thus when he had formed his Scheme of over-running the *Dutch*, he thought fit first to tie up the Hands of the Emperor; and therefore having Intelligence of certain Troubles that had arisen in *Hungary*, and of which being at such a Distance, it would have been a Thing extremely difficult for him to have turned to any Account; he caused it to be insinuated to the Emperor *Leopold*, that having nothing more in view than enjoying peaceably the Dominions yielded to him, by several Treaties, particularly that of *Aix la Chapelle*, by which he acquired *Burgundy*; and pretending to stand in fear that *Spain* and the States-General would endeavour to ravish them from him, by a new War, into which they might have Hopes of drawing the Emperor, on Account of his near Relation in Blood to his Catholic Majesty, and of his close Connection with the States; he therefore testified an Inclination to conclude, purely for the Sake of preserving Peace, a defensive Alliance with his Imperial Majesty, by which they might reciprocally engage not to assist each others Enemies. Into this Snare the Emperor fell, and such an Alliance was actually concluded on the 1st of *November 1671* at *Vien-*
na; by the last Article of which, the contracting

Parties promise to keep it absolutely secret. The Emperor flattered himself, by Means of this Treaty, he had it entirely in his Power to act as he thought fit towards his discontented Subjects; and his most Christian Majesty, on the other Hand, saw himself perfectly covered from any Apprehensions on this side; and of Consequence had all the Leisure he could desire for perfecting the Project he had formed, of humbling, or rather destroying the *Dutch*.

As for the Princes of the Empire, he had found means to secure many of them in his Interest: He flattered the Elector of *Bavaria* with the Hopes of a Marriage; the Elector *Palatine* stood indebted for his Dominions, and for his Dignity, to the Interposition of *France* in the Treaty of *Munster*; the Ecclesiastical Electors, together with the Bishop of *Munster*, and some other Princes, were his by Inclination, and promised, that in Case of a Rupture, they would preserve a strict Neutrality, at least, which was all he could desire. The Elector of *Brandenburgh* alone penetrated the Views of *France*, and could not be drawn into any Engagements, and therefore when the *French* Scheme came to be executed he boldly and honestly ventured to assist the *Dutch*. Yet after all, when the Eyes of the whole World were open, when the Emperor, the King of *Spain*, and many of the *German* Princes saw the Necessity of entering at all Events into a War, which in its Consequences must be fatal to themselves, the Duke of *Hanover* thought to prefer his private Views to the publick Safety, and actually entered into a Treaty with *France*, dated the 10th of *December* 1672, by which he undertook to assist the *French* King against the Elector of *Brandenburgh*, in Case that Prince continued to succour the *Dutch*. This plainly

plainly shews how impossible it is to secure the *German* Princes in the true Interest of *Germany*, and how little Reason there is to hope that they should be drawn to act unanimously against *France*, let the Reasons for their acting in such a Manner, be ever so cogent or apparent. All the World knows what Issue that War had, and every Body who is acquainted with the History of those Times, must see that the Power and Insolence of *France*, will always create such Alliances upon the Continent, as will be sufficient to restrain it. The Parliament of *England* forced *Charles II.* to abandon his Scheme of assisting to destroy the *Dutch*; the Emperor and *Spain* came into the War, tho' with some Reluctance, and the *French* King, after consuming much Blood and Treasure, found himself under a Necessity of submitting to a Peace, which was concluded at *Nimeguen*, in 1676; by which, though he reaped some Advantages, yet they were far short of what he expected, and in Truth of what they had cost them: So that if many Accidents had not concurr'd to divide and distract the Powers of *Europe*, he would scarce have been able, with all his Policy, to have restored his Affairs to such a Degree, as to have been able to make the Figure he did in the next War.

After the Revolution, the Conduct of the *French* King united against him almost all the Princes on the Continent, as well as the Maritime Powers, insomuch that it will be the Wonder of Posterity, how the Kingdom of *France* was able to resist so many Enemies at once. To understand this, we need only to consider the Advantages which *Lewis XIV.* obtained by the Mistakes and Misintelligence of the Allies. The Emperor remained still in his old Disposition, and made so many Efforts towards establishing an illegal Power over the
Princes

Princes and the States of *Germany*, that notwithstanding he was able to awe the Empire into acting against *France*, yet many of its Princes had a secret Correspondence with that Crown, from an Apprehension, that if *France* was reduced as low as the Confederates seemed desirous of seeing her reduced, it must then be a Prey to the Power of the House of *Austria*. On the other Hand, *England* and *Holland* bore much too large a Share in the Expence of that War, which involved them in Debts and Difficulties, with which they had much ado to struggle, and at the same Time, the Coldness and Inactivity of the Princes of the Empire, and the Pride and Poverty of the Emperor, who ready to promise, and ever failing in performing his Promises, deprived them of the Advantages they might otherwise have gained, and left *France* an Appearance of Superiority, though in Truth, she was much inferior in Force to the Allies. So that at last all Parties being weary, a Treaty of Peace was concluded at *Ryswick*, which rather pacified than composed the Troubles of *Europe*, and left both Parties at Liberty to form such Negotiations, as might enable them, in Case of a new War, to atchieve what they had respectively intended when they entered into this.

The Reader will easily discern that the Weakness of the Empire, in this and in the succeeding War, was not owing to want of Force, but to a want of Resolution, and of a Desire of actually performing what they seemed to intend. The Truth of the matter was, that in Virtue of his hereditary Dominions, and the Influence of his Authority, the Emperor was in a Manner Master of the Imperial Diet, and engaged the Empire to enter into Wars with *France*, as often as he found it convenient for his Interest: But as many of the Prin-

ces acted in the first War with great Reluctance, and with little Fidelity, so in the last War the Electors of *Bavaria* and *Colagn*, declared absolutely for *France* and *Spain* against the Emperor, and this as the Reader may see by consulting *Lamberti's* Collections, not without very plausible Reasons, for acting as they did. Yet after all this, one needs only to cast one's Eye over the following Scheme of the Force of the Empire, settled and established by its Constitution, in order to be convinced, that if the States of which it is composed, would act firmly and with unanimity, they must be at all times able not only to check *France*, but even to force that haughty Crown, to accept of such Terms as they should think requisite for their Safety. This Scheme of the *German* Power was founded on the Proportions they were obliged to furnish in Case of a War, and the Number of Men they have raised upon particular Occasions.

The Ecclesiastical Princes are able to raise

	Men
<i>Mentz</i> —————	6,000
<i>Treves</i> —————	6,000
<i>Cologne</i> —————	6,000
<i>Saltsburgh</i> —————	8,000
The Bishop of <i>Munster</i> —————	8,000
————— <i>Leige</i> —————	8,000
————— <i>Wurtsburgh</i> —————	2,000
————— <i>Bamburgh</i> —————	5,000
————— <i>Paderborn</i> —————	3,000
————— <i>Osnaburgh</i> —————	2,500
The Abbot of <i>Fulda</i> —————	6,000
The other Bishops of the Empire } together—————	6,000
Carried over	66,500

	Men
Brought over	66,500
The Abbies and Provostships of the Empire	8,000
Total of the Ecclesiastical Princes	74,500

The Secular Princes are able to raise,

The Emperor for	<i>Hungary</i> —————	30,000
	<i>Bohemia, Silesia,</i>	} 30,000
	<i>and Moravia</i>	
	<i>Austria and his</i>	
	<i>other Dominions</i> } 30,000	
The King of	<i>Prussia</i> —————	40,000
The Elector of	<i>Saxony</i> —————	25,000
The Elector	<i>Palatine</i> —————	15,000
The Duke of	<i>Wirtemberg</i> —————	15,000
The Landgrave of	<i>Hesse-Cassel</i> —————	15,000
The Prince of	<i>Baden</i> —————	10,000
The Prince of	<i>Brunswick Lunen-</i>	} 30,000
	<i>burgh, or Elector of Hanover</i>	
The Duke of	<i>Holstein</i> —————	12,000
The Duke of	<i>Mecklenburg</i> —————	15,000
The Princes of	<i>Anhalt</i> —————	6,000
The Prince of	<i>Lawenburg</i> —————	6,000
The Elector of	<i>Bavaria</i> —————	30,000
The Dukes of	<i>Saxony</i> —————	10,000
The Princes of	<i>Nassau</i> —————	10,000
The other Princes and Imperial	} 50,000	
Towns of the Empire		
Total of the Secular Princes—		379,000
Total of the Eccles. Princes—		74,500
Total of Forces of the Empire		453,500

There

There is one Thing more that I must touch upon before I quit this Part of my Subject, and that is the Figure the Princes of the Empire stood in formerly with Respect to *England*. In the Reign of *Henry VIII.* the Emperor himself took *English* pay, and fought under the Banner of that Monarch; it is not likely therefore that in those Days, the Princes of the Empire were thought much superior in Rank to our Nobility. The Case is indeed somewhat altered since, for the *German* Princes are grown greater and more independent, and the Power of the *English* Nobility is as much declined since that Time. Under the Reign of Queen *Elizabeth*, we had more frequent Intercourse with the *German* Princes; but even then they were not considered in any extraordinary light here, as appears by some Grants of Pensions, very far short of modern Subsidies; scarce so many Shillings as we now give them Pounds, which the Reader may find in *Rymer's* Collections. King *James I.* married his eldest Daughter to the Elector *Palatine*, then called the *Palgrave*, which was not thought a very advantageous Match in those Days, as appears by her Mother's calling her Goody *Palgrave*; and yet this Marriage obliged us to interfere more than we had done before with the Affairs of *Germany*, and in a Manner very little to our Advantage. In the Time of *Charles I.* the Elector *Palatine* took Refuge here with his two Brothers *Rupert* and *Maurice*. As for the Elector he remained with the Parliament, who paid him, for a time, a great deal of Respect; the two younger Brothers served in his Majesty's Army, where, though they were Princes of the Blood, and both very accomplish'd Soldiers, the Haughtiness of their Tempers, and the Roughness of their Manners, did his Majesty

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irreparable

irreparable Mischief. *Charles II.* in the Time of his Exile took Shelter at *Cologn*, was kindly received by the Duke of *Neubourgh*, and treated with great Respect by the Imperial Diet, of which he retained a grateful Remembrance as long as he lived, and during the Course of his Reign held a friendly Correspondence with the Emperor and most of the Princes ; as appears from Sir *William Temple's* Memoirs, and more particularly from the Life of Sir *Leoline Jenkins*. A Treaty of Marriage was once set on Foot between the Duke of *York*, and an Archduchess of *Inspruch* ; and when the King was at War with the *Dutch*, he gave large Subsidies to the Bishop of *Munster*, who in return invaded the Territories of the States, and gave them a great deal of Trouble. The close Correspondence between King *James II.* and the Court of *France*, hindered his having much to do either with the Emperor or Empire, which proved of great Disadvantage to him, and in the End was one of the principal Causes of the Success of the Revolution. After which we came to have a close Conjunction with the Emperor, and a very friendly Intercourse with several Princes of the Empire, to whom we paid large Subsidies, for the Troops they thought fit to lend for the Service of, what was called, the common Cause ; and in which, exclusive of the Sums they got by the War, they seem'd to have at least as much Interest as we. So that while the *Englisch* and *Dutch* were fighting the Battles of the Empire, as well as their own, they paid the *German* Princes for their Assistance ; and those Princes received vast Sums annually, for doing what, according to the then System of Things, they should have done out of a pure Regard to their own Interest, since they all of them had Pretensions upon *France*, and expected Satisfaction,

faction, respectively, as to their Demands; whenever a general Peace came to be made; and thus by a Felicity peculiar to *German* Politicks, their less powerful Neighbours not only fought on their Side, but paid them likewise for fighting for themselves.

We are now come to the Second Part of our Task, in which we are to examine the present State of *Germany*, with Respect to its own Power, and the Relation it has to the rest of *Europe*. It will, previous to this, be necessary to observe, that by the present State of *Germany*, I mean the Condition that great Country is in, since the Imperial Title has been transferred from the House of *Austria* to that of *Bavaria*. This I must take leave to say is, in my humble Opinion, a Circumstance agreeable to most, and not unpleasant to any of the Princes of the Empire. They felt sufficiently the Weight which his hereditary Dominions gave to every Emperor of the House of *Austria*, and were uneasy enough under it, because they saw that it was constantly directed to the securing his own Dominions, and aggrandizing his own Family; with which the States of the Empire thought they had no immediate Concern. This Disposition was extremely remarkable in the three last Monarchs of that House, *Leopold*, *Joseph* and *Charles*: The former was an ambitious, crafty and obstinate Prince, infinitely more desirous of making himself absolute at home, than formidable abroad; his Maxims of Government rendered him the weakest Prince in *Europe*, notwithstanding the Extent of his Dominions; his love of arbitrary Power, kept the *Hungarians*, who have so nobly defended his Grand-Daughter, almost always Rebels, and his Bigotry made the People of *Bohemia* Slaves. His Usage of the House of *Bavaria*

drove them to a close Conjunction with *France*, and his Pride, Parsimony, and positive Adherence to his own Notions lost him the Succession of *Spain*. The Emperor *Joseph* was in some Measure the Reverse of his Father, for though he had as much Haughtiness, yet instead of being indolent he was fierce and arrogant, full of the Grandeur of his House, and very little inclined to find out the Distinction between Slaves and Subjects. He was always expecting mighty Succours from his Allies, and always deficient in what he promised for the Support of the common Cause. His Behaviour towards the Princes of the Empire, made them backward in every thing ; and as our glorious General, the Duke of *Marlborough*, told some of their Ministers, at a Conference, their Negligence inspired *France* with Hopes, which alone prevented her accepting the Terms offered by the Allies ; and indeed it was on this side only, that throughout the whole War the *French* had any Advantage, except in *Spain*, where the *German* Politicks defeated all the Maritime Powers could do in Support of the *German* Interest. *Charles VI.* was raised to the Empire by the Endeavours of the Allies, and he discovered even before his Election the Genius of his Family, by declaring he would not accept the Imperial Crown, on the Terms it had been worn by his Brother and Father, and the Capitulation was accordingly altered to suit it to his Humour. His severe Government of the *Italians*, drew them to plot against him, and to intrigue with *France* and *Spain* ; as his Ill-usage of the House of *Savoy* opened a Passage to those Armies, which deprived him of *Naples* and *Sicily*, and very narrowly missed of driving him entirely out of *Italy*. His Behaviour to this Nation was not the most grateful ;
and

and his Conduct in respect to the *Dutch*, was far from answering the Obligations he was under to that Republick. His obstinate Refusal of all Terms of Accomodation with *Spain*, for a long Time kept the Ballance of Power fluctuating, as his sudden and unnatural Conjunction lost it, by the Turn that Alliance gave to the Politicks of the Maritime Powers. His War with the *Turks* was ill-contrived, and worse executed; and his Dependence upon *France* to the last, from an Apprehension that Zeal for Religion would bind her to his Interest, was an Error for which his Family has smarted severely since. Taking therefore all this together, I make no Scruple of saying, that the Power of the *Germanic* Body is increased by this Change; and that there is more Reason to expect the Princes and States of the Empire should vigorously exert their Force, now they are free, then there was to hope it, while they were under the Influence of an Emperor who considered them absolutely as his Subjects, and yet confined his Cares to the Inhabitants of his hereditary Dominions, or rather of the upper and lower *Austria*.

This I know will be considered by many as a Political Paradox, and by some as a dangerous Maxim, the Belief of which ought by all means to be discouraged. But this moves not me; I write from no other Motive than from the Love of Truth and my Country, for which Reason, I think myself as little bound to conceal whatever I have Reason to think may be divulged to her Benefit, as to publish what may gratify the Prejudices of particular Persons, and yet prove little to her Advantage. It is a Jest for any Man to pique himself upon being an Enemy to *France*, or a Friend to *Germany*; the sole Characteristick here of a Patriot, is his Love to *Britain*; for whoever sacrifices

sacrifices his native Country to Fondness, or Fury to an ill-judged Partiality, or an ill-timed Resentment, is certainly a weak if not a wicked Man, let his Quality be what it will, or his Reputation, even for the Knowledge of foreign Affairs, ever so well established. The great Point now is thoroughly to understand the Question before us, that is to say, what is the true Strength of the *Germanick* Body, how far they need, and to what degree it is in our Power to assist them. This I say is the Question, at present, most material to *Britain*, for if it be not thoroughly and timely understood, we may run the Hazard of exhausting ourselves, to such a Degree, as we may never be able to recover. In respect to this very Circumstance, how fatal may any Mistake be about it? If the State of *Germany* is bettered by this Change in the Empire, and our Welfare depends so much, as it is generally thought to do, on the Security of the *Germanic* Body, we should be actually fighting against ourselves, if we should use our warmest Endeavours to overturn our new System, and restore the old one? But perhaps some Proofs will be expected of the Truth of what I say, and these I shall lay down in very few Words. First then, it appears that such an Emperor freely elected is most agreeable to the *German* Constitution; and it is a general Rule in Policy, that the Force of a Nation is then greatest, when the Spirit of its Government is in its utmost Vigour. Secondly, it is most likely that the Princes and States of *Germany*, will exert themselves most under an Emperor from whom they have much to hope, and nothing to fear; which will be always the Case, so long as they are not governed by a Prince, whose hereditary Dominions give him more Power, than even their conjunctive Force would be able to deal with.

with. Thirdly, the Authority which such an Emperor may acquire by a wise and upright Administration, will actually raise a new Power in *Germany*; the House of *Austria* still retaining its former Strength, together with the Means of exerting it more freely. These Reasons appear to me extremely cogent, and I can yet add another, which must prove conclusive, and it is this, that his Majesty, as Elector of *Hanover*, gave his Vote for his present Imperial Majesty, which he would never have done, if he had not conceived his Election agreeable to the Interest of the *Germanick* Body; he who thinks otherwise, and would ascribe his Vote to the Terror of *French* Arms, and the Danger of the Electorate, is unacquainted with the Firmness of his Majesty's Temper, and must be at once an Enemy to the Royal Family, and no great Friend to his Country.

After clearing this Point, which I think I have effectually done, I shall proceed to another, which is the prodigious Growth of Power amongst the *German* Princes. The King of *Prussia*, is at least ten Times more considerable a Potentate, than the antient Elector of *Brandenburgh*; as the Reader will easily discern, if he consults that manual of modern Politicks, *M. Van Hoey's* Letters. There he will see that the *French* Court consider his Power as a Ballance to their own, and represent it as such to the States, which they would never have done, if they had not thought it plausible at least, if not clear to a degree of Self-Evidence; his late Conduct with Respect to *France*, ought not at all to lessen our Opinion of his Power, since it is not reasonable to believe, that a Prince who has such extensive Territories, and withal such boundless Ambition, should ever think of becoming dependant on any other Power, or even of entering into such Measures,

Measures, as might encrease its Influence in *Germany*, to such a Degree as might endanger his own Safety ; this I say is a thing not only improbable, but altogether impossible ; and therefore we ought to consider this Prince as one of the greatest Powers in *Germany*, and a Power too that will be continually growing. I shall readily admit that this may be in some Respects a disagreeable Prospect, but in the Light, in which we are now to consider it, it is apparently otherwise. *France* might much more easily swallow up Five, or Six little Principalities, than she could conquer so great a Force, as this Monarch can and has brought into the Field ; which Consideration may with like Justice be applied to other Princes, that we shall mention ; and therefore their Grandeur must be regarded as a true Barrier against the Power of *France*, unless we imagine they can be wheedled into Slavery, and if so, I doubt the Maritime Powers cannot force them to be free.

The King of *Poland*, as Elector of *Saxony*, is also much more potent than his Predecessors, and as he lives in a very good Correspondence with all the Princes of his Family, he is able to do much, whenever he is forced to exert his utmost Strength. I am sensible, it is a common Opinion, that his Kingdom is of little use to his Electorate ; but I know too, that such as say this, are not very well acquainted with the Maxims of *German* Princes, who have always a warm, and laudable Affection for their Hereditary Dominions. Besides, the Revenues of *Poland* are very considerable, little short, if I am rightly informed, of our civil List ; and as the King does not reside much at *Warsaw*, and has always abundance of *Polish* Noblemen about his Court, there must be a great deal saved, and the Electorate must be long ago indemnified for

for the necessary Expences of the Election. Add to this, that his *Polish* Majesty might easily employ the whole Forces of that Kingdom in *Germany*, if he should either engage in a Quarrel, agreeable to the Sense of his *Polish* Subjects, or should be attacked, without any just Ground, in his own Dominions. We know what a Figure the late King *Augustus* made, and we can therefore easily Conjecture, what may be in the power of any other enterprising Prince of the *Saxon* Line: We ought also to take into the Account, the Relation between this Family and the House of *Austria*; to which, according to the Pragmatic Sanction, he is next Heir, and at no such Distance, as to render it impossible, that the present Generation should see the Dominions of both Houses in one Hand; and then he would be very near a Match for *France*, without any Assistance.

The Elector of *Hanover*, is certainly a very rich and powerful Prince; much more so than his Ancestors. Our late King by Marriage, and by Purchase, doubled the Strength, as well as the Extent of his Dominions; and if the Peace of *Germany* was once settled, I do not doubt but further Acquisitions might be made. Besides, the Princes of his Family, who are now in a Manner dependant on the Electorate, are very powerful; and the Alliances the present King has made in *Germany*, are such as already strengthen him much, and must in Time do it more. So that to imagine *France* could at any time awe his *German* Territories, is a Notion very ill founded, they might do it once indeed, by a Concurrence of odd Accidents, but I believe Nobody that considers how dear the *French* have paid for this last Enterprize of theirs, will believe that they will suddenly trust a great Army in the Heart of *Germany* again;

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especially if right Measures be taken to cement firmly those Powers, that ought to have a natural Affection for each other, and who have certainly the same Interest, whatever different Views they may sometimes, through Passion, Pique, or an ill regulated Ambition, be tempted to pursue. These Sort of Delusions are but momentary, and if their Neighbours were not too much alarmed by them, the Laws of the Empire, the Interposition of other *German* Princes, and the Representations of their own Subjects, would soon bring them back to a right Sense of Things. But if upon every little disorder in the lower *Saxony*, it is conceived that the whole System of *Europe* is shaken, and therefore new Alliances must be formed, there will be no End of such Commotions; because it will be visibly the Interest of several Princes to promote such Disturbances, purely for the Sake of obtaining Subsidies, and letting out their Troops at a very high Rate, which draws immense Sums of Money into Countries, where heretofore very little of it was to be seen, and which is perhaps of still greater Consequence to those who pay it, furnishes the Means of setting up and carrying on Manufactures, that otherwise would never have been thought of; whereby those who are the Dupes of this Sort of *German* Politicks, at once exhaust themselves, and cut off the Means, by which Part of their Money might be brought back again.

It will I dare say appear a greater Paradox than any I have yet advanced, when I insist on the Emperor's being a very powerful Prince, as Elector of *Bavaria*, but whoever considers that his Electorate, and the upper *Palatinate*, subsisted so long his own, two *French*, and two *Austrian*, Armies, and remembers at the same Time, that there is

a wide Difference between a ruined Country, and a lost one, will believe also that I have Reason on my Side. I know very well, that it may be replied that it is not only ruined but a lost Country to him at present ; but I dare prophesy that it will not be long so, and I hope when this Prophecy is fulfilled, that People will be content to believe, that *German* Princes are the best Judges of their own Interests, and will sooner or later convince the rest of *Europe*, that they are so. His Father likewise lost this Country, but he recovered it, not so much by the Interposition of *France*, as by the visible Concern expressed for him, by that very Diet, which put him under the Bann of the Empire : We see at present how great Respect is paid him, stript as he is of his Dominions, at *Frankfort*, and I doubt we shall soon see that his Distress will raise him more potent Friends, than ever were his *French* Auxiliaries. But to return to our Subject ; the Electorate of *Bavaria*, and the upper *Palatinate* are rich and fruitful Countries, so that if ever the Empetor is peaceably established at *Munich*, and is able to form his Court there, he will soon repair the Damages his Country has sustained by this destructive War, and this is a new Advantage that arises from transferring the Imperial Crown from one Family to another, and must appear so to such as are proper Judges of the Power and Influence of an Emperor, in providing nobly for all the younger Branches of his Family. I shall not say much of the Elector *Palatine*, or of the Ecclesiastical Electors ; but this I think is self evident, that whatever Inconveniences their Subjects may have suffered by the Passage of so many Armies through their Countries, yet the prodigious Sums of Money, spent amongst them by the *English* and *French*, must have greatly increased their Wealth,

and supplied them with such Means for carrying on their Manufactures and Commerce as they could never otherwise have acquired. I do not say that particular People have found their Advantage in this, but the whole must have done it; for if ready Money is brought into a Country, and left there, that Country must be richer, than it was before.

The Landgrave of *Hesse*, who is at present King of *Sweden*, is much too considerable a Prince, to be passed over in the Account of *German* Potentates, without particular Notice; his Family have been always distinguished in the Disputes of *Germany*, by the Wisdom of their own Conduct, and by the gallant Behaviour of their Subjects. It is true that his Dominions are not large, or the Country remarkable for its Fertility; it is likewise true, that it is split into several Principalities, and seated in the Part of *Germany* least favourable to Trade; and yet under all these Difficulties the Landgrave of *Hesse* is, after the Electors, the most considerable Prince in *Germany*, and the present Emperor has thought fit to raise him to a Level with the Electors, in every thing except Title; and this, notwithstanding we have 6,000 of his Troops in our pay, who were once within three Day's March of a Battle, with the Emperor's Auxiliaries, and made afterwards as good a Figure, as any of the *German* Troops in our pay. I do not believe that *Hesse* has lost any thing by the Landgrave's being raised to the Dignity of King of *Sweden*, but though I have the highest Esteem for the great and amiable Qualities of his present *Swedish* Majesty, yet I should not care to have it put upon me to prove, that *Sweden* has reaped any mighty Advantage, from his Administration; though I believe him to be as brave a Man, and

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as good a King, as ever sat upon that Throne. I know however that there have been Malecontents in that Country, who have insinuated that an overweaning Fondness for his Family, and an earnest Desire to have the Crown of *Sweden* pass through the collateral Branch, as well as the Dominions of *Hesse*, and some Negotiations entered into, for this Purpose, with a certain Crown, as famous for family Attachments, gave rise, or at least gave Strength to that Party, which has since changed the whole System of Affairs in the *North*, and given his *Swedish* Majesty the Successor in the World, which we may safely say, he was least inclined to. But however he may have managed Affairs in the North, where he considered himself as a Kind of Political Father-in-Law, he has been most certainly a very tender Parent to his Subjects in *Germany*, and though it may be objected that he has exposed their Persons for the Sake of Gain, by letting out his Troops to several Princes for many Years together, yet I think I may affirm, that except in the late unlucky Battle of *Braunau*, they were as safe in the Exercise of their Military Function, as if they had remained in their Blacksmiths Forges, and were only better paid; so that now Silver is as Plenty in *Hesse*, as in any Country in the Empire; tho' heretofore, I have been credibly informed, they made use of Leather, stampt with the Landgrave's Arms, to supply the Place of Money.

To these I might add the Duke of *Wirtemberg*, a very great and potent Prince; the Counts of *Nassau*, the Princes of *Baden*, and many others; but that I avoid Prolixity, and mention no more than what I am obliged to by my Subject. Last of all I shall shut up what I have here to say, as to the present Power of *Germany*, with observing that

that the Queen of *Hungary* has now near 200,000 regular Troops in her Service, and if we may believe what the *Vienna Gazette* has lately told us, concerning the Declaration of Count *Palfi*, Palatine of *Hungary*, that besides recruiting the Troops of that Nation, they could supply her with 86,000 more, without exhausting their Force, to a degree of endangering the Safety of that Kingdom; we may say of the *French*, with Respect to the House of *Austria*, what the late King of *Poland* said of *Charles XII.* wintering in *Saxony*, *that he never knew 'till then the Worth of his Subjects.* We must likewise remember, that since this War began, the *Bohemians* have been spared, that is to say, the Queen of *Hungary* has not received from them any Supplies of Men or Money, proportionable to what she would have done, in Case that Kingdom had not became the Seat of War. Upon the whole therefore I think it fully and clearly appears, that the Force of the House of *Austria*, is not at all lessened by transferring the Imperial Dignity to another Family, and which it is not impossible, may in Time be of great Use to the House of *Austria* itself. As it is, we have seen the Queen of *Hungary* do much more than any Emperor of her Family has ever done, though it is clear that they might have done it, as well as she, and no doubt would have done it, if they had not found other Powers inclined to do things for them, some upon one Principle, some on another, for every kind of Enthusiasm has been favourable to the House of *Austria*. The Cause of Christendom brought *John Sobieski*, King of *Poland*, to the Relief of *Vienna*, when it was besieged by the *Turks* in 1683: And the Care of the common Cause brought the Duke of *Marlborough* with the Army of the Allies to *Blenheim* in 1704, when

when the House of *Austria* was again on the Point of being crushed by its own Weight, but never 'till now was it saved by its own Force; which shews how great an Injury we do to this most illustrious Family, when we are too hasty, or too bountiful in our Succours. It is for the Interest of *Europe* that the House of *Austria* should be supported, that I admit, but would it hurt the Interest of *Europe*, would it in the least Prejudice the common Cause, if the House of *Austria* was in a Condition to support itself? But it may be said, that if you trust to this, it might be overwhelmed on a sudden, and then all Assistance will come too late. Overwhelming of a sudden, a Power able to raise 200,000 regular Troops, and having always two thirds of that Number in pay, is a Paradox with a Vengeance. Besides the House of *Austria* have been heretofore extremely apt to mistake their own Strength, of which I will give the Reader a most extraordinary Instance. The Kingdom of *Hungary* had been always elective, yet in the Year 1683, the Emperor *Leopold* demanded in a Diet at *Presbourg*, that it should be made Hereditary, for this most singular Reason; that he had spent more Money in defending that Kingdom from the *Turks*, than it was worth, and therefore he conceived he had as good a Title to it, as to the rest of his hereditary Dominions. This Emperor little thought that in half a Century, the Inhabitants of this worthless Kingdom of *Hungary*, would not only secure but recover his hereditary Countries, from the strongest and best conducted Confederacy, that ever was formed against his House.

By this Time I hope I have fully made good what I promised, as to the second Point, and have shewn that with Respect to the Power of *France*,
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and the Ballance of *Europe*, the latter is not in Danger from any real Weakness of the *Germanic* Body, in proportion to the former, but from the Want of Unanimity, Public Spirit, and generous Concern for their Country, in the several Princes and States that compose that most august Assembly, the Diet of *Francfort*. If therefore we are truly inclined to assist the *Germans*, in the most useful Way to them, and the least burthensome to ourselves, we ought to send over to them some of our great Patriot Speakers, who overturned the last Administration by their Eloquence, and who it is thought will very soon have little else to do, as Missionaries to propagate right Principles, to inspire them with Constancy, Steadiness, and above all Frugality in public Affairs, which would soon set them above the Want of Foreign Succours, and enable them, if they thought it necessary, to take from *France*, all that in many Ages she has ever purloined from the Empire, even in half a Campaign. That this is no Chimerical Project, or Repetition of the E——— of S———r's crude Notions, of marching at once to *Paris*, so highly ridiculed by those who yet would encourage us to maintain a War for the Behalf of the Empire, without its Consent, may appear from the following Scheme of the present Strength of *Germany*, which never will (by any competent judge) be contested, compared with the utmost Force of *France*, that, as the Infallible Author of *Faction Detected* informs us, Page 122. of the *Second Edition*, cannot bring Three Hundred Twenty Thousand Men into the Field, though her very Being were at Stake.

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The Queen of <i>Hungary</i> and <i>Bobemia</i> , or in other Words, the House of <i>Au-</i> <i>stria</i> in its present Situation————	200000
The King of <i>Prussia</i> , according to the exactest List of the Forces now in his Service, which if it was necessary he might possibly augment to double the Number————	150000
The King of <i>Poland</i> , as Elector of <i>Saxony</i> , according to the Number of Men in his Service, in the Month of <i>June, 1741</i> ————	75000
His Imperial Majesty, as Elector of <i>Bavaria</i> , who in the present War has had on Foot at once————	45000
His <i>Britannic</i> Majesty, as Elector of <i>Hanover</i> ————	30000
The Elector <i>Palatine</i> ————	30000
The Landgrave of <i>Hesse Cassel</i> ————	24000
The Rest of the Princes of <i>Germany</i> , ac- cording to their present Establishments, taking in the Troops of the Circles—	240000
	794000

This is so fair and moderate a Calculation, that it cannot with any Reason be questioned; but if any one will suggest that the Intrigues of *France* may engage the Northern Crowns, or the Empress of *Russia* to create a Diversion, which however would be very improbable, if the States of the Empire were united, the Kings of *Poland* and *Prussia* might be left to deal with them, and even then the *Germanic* Body might without any Diffi-

culty bring down 350,000 Men upon *France*, which, with the Assistance of the Fleets of the Maritime Powers, would be much more than sufficient to reduce the House of *Bourbon*, powerful as she is, to Reason; or if that could not be done, to such a Situation, as might render her unreasonableness uneasy only to such as have the Misfortune to be her Subjects, especially after she has exhausted the Treasures and Inhabitants of her Dominions to such a Degree, as it is notorious she has done, within these seven Years past.

The Notions that we have entertained of the Distresses of the *Germans*, and of their Inability to resist *France*, have been owing partly to their own Representations, which to be sure were such as suited best their own Interests, and partly from the Views of great People at Home, who found their private Advantage in supporting these Misrepresentations. It is not however to be denied, that *France*, has had all along considerable Advantages in her Disputes with the Emperor and Empire; but this, as we have before shew'd, was owing to the Dread that most of the Members of the Empire had of the Power of the House of *Austria*, which rendered them afraid of its Success, and well pleased whenever it was humbled, though partly at their own Expence. If any one should demand, why since the Force of *Germany* is so great, and the Usurpations of *France* so many, the Princes and States of the Empire do not unite to do themselves Justice, and restore to their Country, what has been pared from it by that perfidious Power. I must say this Question, which imports us more than we are aware of, is not very hard to answer, and the Reader will find himself in a condition to do it effectually, if he considers the following

following Remarks, which he will find not only founded on Reason, but verified by Experience.

It is first of all to be considered, that the great Powers in *Germany* have more Respect to their own particular Views, for the aggrandizing of their Families, by enlarging their Dominions than to the common Good of *Germany*, which has always given the *French* an Opportunity either of detaching them from the common Cause, as they did the Electors of *Bavaria* or *Cologne* in the Beginning of the last War; or of prevailing upon them, to do them private Services, which was the Case in King *William's* War; when several of the Princes, whose Names it would not be altogether so convenient to mention at present, betrayed the Councils of the Allies, and in some Cases went further to earn their Pensions they privately received from that Court. This shews that the Losses they sustained in that War, was not so much owing to the Power of *France*, as to their own Jealousies and Avarice, and is a Demonstration of the Weakness of the *French*, who have always trusted more to their Intrigues and to their Money, than to the Force of their Arms. In the next Place, let us observe that the Electors and other Princes, whose Dominions are on the Frontiers of the *French* Territories, were extremely awed by a Power so much superior to their own. Since in all Wars between the Empire and *France*, the House of *Austria*, and the greater Princes, were Gainers, while these States and their Subjects were constant Sacrifices, the *French* taking a Pleasure often in revenging upon them, the Disappointments they met with elsewhere; as for example, in the War in 1672, the *French* committed such horrid Cruelties in the *Palatinate*, that the Elector *Palatine* sent a Challenge to M. *Turrenne*,

which that General refused to accept, without the Leave of the King his Master. Now though this Dread of the *French* is certainly an Inducement to such Princes to act, as if they were in the Interest of *France*, yet we can never suppose that it really inclines them to that Interest; nor can we doubt, if they had a proper Opportunity, they would forbear returning the *French* the many Compliments of Fire and Sword which they are at present in their Debt. But then we ought, thirdly, to remark, that both the greater and lesser Princes of *Germany* have actually found, or thought they have found their Account, in nursing, as it were, Wars in their own Country, by letting out their Troops for Hire, receiving Subsidies, and catching now one Piece of a Country, and then another, as Occasion offered. Let us but consider the immense Sums that were paid by *England* and *Holland* for Auxiliaries in the last War, which did not fall short of 20000000 Guilders annually; let us remember what large Remittances have been made from Time to Time ever since, for the Hire of Troops, that Princes were to hold in Readiness, though they were never called upon, so much as to march; and let us not forget what it has cost *France* within these Five, and ourselves, and the *Dutch* too within these Three Years, to furnish Fuel for the Wars in *Germany*, and we shall easily perceive that considerable Profit may be made even of this Trade of Confusion; for I think that even the Author of *Faction detested* allows, that of all the Money sent into *Germany*, not a Penny of it finds its Way back again, as it does out of other Countries, but when the War is over, which drains them of their superfluous People, that were bred up only to the Trade of Blood, their Princes sit down in Peace, and enjoy the Riches that have been

been acquired in this manner from other Nations. A fourth Remark is this, that even the Practice beforementioned, how little agreeable soever it may be to their true Interest, considered in a political Light, yet has by Accident proved a great Addition to their Strength, by increasing the Forces of *Germany*, and rendering the Care and Discipline of their Troops the principal Study of many, I might say most of their Princes; so that it is now a quite different Thing from what it was, with Respect to a *German Army*. Whenever a Confederacy is formed, and the Armies are to take the Field, new hasty Levies are by no means necessary; they have regular Forces enough to form whatever Armies they please, and these in a Condition to march at an Hour's warning, with proper Trains of Artillery, and whatever else is requisite for a modern Campaign. Their Officers are numerous, and withal Men of Courage and Experience; so that 50000 *Germans* are an equal Match for 50000 *French* Troops, even on their own Frontiers; and an Over-Match for 70000 if they pass the *Rhine*, and venture into *Germany*, as Experience has demonstrated. I shall conclude with observing, Fifthly, that as the *German* Princes and States have been but very lately released from the Influence of an *Austrian* Emperor, which as I have shewn was a Kind of Influence extremely detrimental to their Interest, so it is not a little uncertain, what use they may make of their Freedom; but the Probability is that they will use it for their own Security. This is evident, that in her last Attempt, *France* did not depend upon her own Power, or upon the numerous Armies she sent into *Germany*, but principally upon her Alliances with *German* Princes, and the Discoveries they made of their Inclinations to lay hold of the present

present Juncture, to secure themselves against all future Apprehensions, from the Power of the House of *Austria*, by dismembring its Dominions, and dividing them among themselves. It was this, and principally the Share the King of *Prussia* offered to take in it, that drew *France* into acting as she did, contrary to the Sentiments of Cardinal *Fleury*, who, with great good Sense, maintained that even the Accomplishment of this Project would prove prejudicial to *France*.

The ancient and present State of *Germany* being thus compared, I think it is impossible for any reasonable Man to doubt, that the latter is infinitely superior to the former, notwithstanding what *Cluverius* has advanced, who speaks only of the Extent of Territory; for in his Opinion the ancient *Germany* comprehended the three Northern Kingdoms; but Extent of Territory; and a Multitude of barbarous People is a Strength far inferior to that of a well governed and a well disciplined Nation. It is also evident, that for many Centuries *Germany* has been the natural Ballance to *France*, and in that Respect of great Consequence to *Europe*. But then there is another Thing to be observed, which is this, that the Force of *Germany* was always superior to that of *France*, and became of equal Weight, only by the Variation of the Ballance of Power in *Germany*. If the Emperor *Charles V.* could have made himself as absolute there, as he had done in *Spain*, and the Low Countries, and even in *Italy*, by overturning their respective Constitutions, he would unquestionably have been too hard for *France*, which was the Reason that our *Henry VIII.* opposed him, and joined with *Francis I.* the Pope, and other *Italian* Princes. The Reformation created a new Ballance of Power in *Germany*, in Respect to which our
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Concern for Religion obliged us frequently to take a Part, as it afterwards did the King of *Sweden*; and as I have shewn the absolute Necessity of having Recourse to foreign Powers to poize the Weight of the House of *Austria*, and the popish Princes who adhered to it, made the *German* Princes conceive it their Interest, to give a Part of their Country on one side to the *French*, and on the other to the Kings of *Sweden* and *Denmark*. After the Treaty of *Munster*, or, to speak more correctly, after the Treaties of *Westphalia*, which comprehend those of *Osnabrugh* and *Munster*, the old Ballance of Power took Place; and from that Time it became very difficult for the Maritime Powers, to distinguish their own Interest with Respect to *Germany*; for on the one Hand, it was frequently necessary to support the Emperor, in order to preserve the Ballance of *Europe*; and on the other Hand, it was sometimes as necessary, both from religious and political Considerations, to assist the *German* Princes, in order to preserve the Ballance of Power in *Germany*, the Fluctuation of which, and the crafty Management of the Scales, has been for seventy Years past the true Source of the *French* Power. This was first discovered by Cardinal *Richlieu*, and has been the great Secret of all their Ministers ever since, though none of them ever understood it so well as the last. It was the original Opinion of Cardinal *Fleury*, that *France* ought to have executed her Guaranty of the Pragmatick Sanction in the utmost Strictness, nay even to have given her Interest in the ensuing Election to the Duke of *Lorraine*; for this plain Reason, that it would have preserved the old Ballance, which they knew by Experience they were very well able to manage, for their own Advantage. But as he very wisely observed, the
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raising the Elector of *Bavaria* to the Empire, was destroying the old Ballance, in order to establish a new one, the Effects of which could not be known or foreseen, and as to the Partition of the *Austrian* Dominions, it might as well prove the Ruin of *France* as of that House. For in Order to bring this about, there was a Necessity of uniting the Houses of *Bavaria*, *Saxony*, and *Brandenburgh*; and in Case they had carried their Point, and had fixed themselves in the entire Possession of the Dominions of the House of *Austria*, any two of these Powers without, and any one of them in Conjunction with the Empire, must have been an Over-Match for *France*. As it is not the Power only, but the very Safety of that Nation, I might say the Being of it, hangs at present on a single Thread; whenever the present Emperor deserts them, the *French* must be sooner or latter undone. How far depriving him of his hereditary Dominions, exhausting them to the last Shilling, and blowing up all his Fortresses may further this Purpose, or how far a publick Declaration, that the Power of the House of *Austria* is to be restored, in its utmost Extent, may contribute thereto, or to the proper Establishment of a Ballance of Power in *Europe*, is a Point not easily to be discussed, though it certainly is of the last Importance, and that upon which the Safety, Peace and Prosperity of all *Europe* must depend.

We are now advanced to the Third, which I esteem the hardest Part of this Treatise, but as I hope I have hitherto maintained the Character of a fair and diligent Writer, so I shall spare no Pains in what is to follow; not so much from any Prospect of Praise, as from an earnest Desire of doing the Nation Service, which I must certainly do

do, if I can either excite a Spirit of Frugality, or oblige the Patrons of our present expensive Measures, to exhibit their Reasons for them in a clearer and more convenient Manner, than they have hitherto done, so that either we may save our Money, or be satisfied that it is spent to some purpose. In making such an Enquiry, we shall but follow the Steps of our Ancestors, who never patiently submitted, to the raising of heavy Taxes, without expostulating with those who had the Management of them, as to the Motives of their imposing, and the Manner in which they were employed. They had likewise Concerns abroad as well as we, and took a great deal of Pains so to manage them, as that they might be to their Advantage. One would conceive therefore, since the Form of our Government is still in a great Measure the same, that some Benefit might be reaped from a Review of their Conduct. To avoid however running into a dry, tedious, and in some Measure useless Deduction of Facts, I will content myself with a few obvious Reflections, on such Capital Points as seem to be common both to them and to us.

One of the most ancient, and least varied Maxims of our Government, seems to have been the Love of Peace, in preference to all the Advantages that could be proposed from Conquest, all the Reputation that might arise from Valour and Victory, and all the Benefits that might result from fixing the Ballance of Power to our liking: Thus in the fifth Year of our victorious *Edward III.* it appears by the Rolls, that a Parliament was called in order to devise how Peace might be best procured. In the seventeenth of the same Prince, we find on the Rolls a Petition of the Lords and Commons, entreating him to make Peace with

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France, and advising him to demand the Mediation of the Pope, which it seems he did, but to little Purpose, for the War still continued, so that in his twentieth Year, he found it requisite to direct the Bishops and Clergy throughout the Land to open to the People, in their Sermons, the just Causes of the War, the great Unwillingness of the King to cause the Effusion of christian Blood, the Obstinacy of the Enemy, and the hard Necessity he was under of continuing the War. Two Years afterwards we find him acknowledging in Parliament, that the War had brought *gravia Onera & multa Mala*, heavy Burthens, and great Mischiefs on his People, wherefore he declares it was his Intention to go over in Person to *France*, in order to treat of Peace, directing in the mean Time his Bishops, Clergy and People to offer up humble and devout Prayers to God, to direct this Action to the Glory of his Creator, the Peace of his native Country, and the Advantage of the whole Christian World, which he believed could not follow but from a firm Amity with his Neighbours. I speak all this out of the Record, and much more I might alledge to the same Purpose under this and other Reigns ; so little Truth is there in the common Opinion, that our Kings heretofore were altogether absolute, and governed as they thought fit, without any Respect either to the Good of their Subjects, or to the Sentiments they had of them. As a further Proof of this, I cannot help taking Notice of another Record in the same Reign, which is still preserved in the Tower, wherein the King says, that not through his own Desire, but from the unforeseen Events of War, he had been driven to vast Expences, he therefore, addressing himself to the Archbishop of *Canterbury*, prays, *Quod cum Populus Regni sui*
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variis Oneribus, Tellagiis & Impositionibus, ut idem Archiepisc. Indulgentiarum muneribus, plus Exhortationibus & aliis modis eundem Populum placare studeat, & ipsum Regem excuset, that since the Subjects of his Kingdom were over-charged with many Burthens, Tallages and other Impositions, the said Archbishop would by grant of Indulgences, seasonable Exhortations and other Ways endeavour to pacify the People, and excuse the King. We may conclude from hence, that the best and bravest of our Kings were no Enemies to the just Liberties of the Subjects, but naturally expected that in Case their Expences exceeded their settled Income, so that they were forced to ask the Aid of their Subjects, they should become answerable to them for the Sums levied upon them; and this you see does not extend only to the laying Accounts before a Parliament, but the giving full Satisfaction to the Nation. King *Edward* did not fear his Subjects Disobedience, his own Power and the Laws of the Land secured that, but what he apprehended was the Loss of their Affection; he thought it was the Part of a Tyrant to rule over the Bodies, and exhaust the Estates of his People, and that it became a King to have Dominion over their Hearts.

There was another Point in which they were no less clear, and that was the Affecting, under pretence either of Glory or Gain, to preserve great Dominions on the Continent. *Matthew Paris* tells us, that *William* the Conqueror made it his sole Business to scrape together Money, justly, or unjustly was all one to him, and when he had got it, he transported it to *Normandy*; of his Son *William*, he says, that to keep that Province he fled *England*, and he says much the same thing of *Henry I.* The same Reflections occur in our best Writers, as to every Reign, while we had

any Footing in *France* ; and even the keeping of *Calais* was a Burthen to us, so that out of pure Policy Queen *Elizabeth* never struggled heartily for its Recovery. But what principally galled the *English*, under the Princes of the *Norman* Race, was their being Subjects, in Respect to their foreign Dominions, to the King of *France*. They were at their Wits End when they saw their royal Letters addressed to the *French* Monarch, in these Words, To our Sovereign Lord the King of *France*. They could not help thinking themselves a Province, while their Princes were obliged to use this Style, and with a View to shake it off they so frequently consented to their King's laying claim to that Crown, which yet upon Reflection they found attended with as mortifying Circumstances. On this account, we find that by two Acts of Parliament, the first in the fourteenth of *Edward* III. and the second in the eighth of *Henry* V. they provided that the Subjects of *England* should owe no Obedience to the King as King of *France*, nor the Kingdom of *England* be in any wise subjected by such a Union to that Crown. At last, in the seventeenth of *Henry* VI. when a Supply was demanded for the Recovery of that Crown, the Commons answered plainly, that the gaining *France* would only afford a Colour for the King's going often abroad thither, by which Absence he must necessarily occasion great Decay, and Desolation to this State, besides transporting of our Money, which would enrich that Country, and impoverish their own, and therefore they refused it. No Man certainly, who has a real Concern for his Country, can deny that our Ancestors reasoned right, or can hesitate a Moment, whether he ought to applaud their Conduct, or not, who preferred their own Safety,
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and the Ease of their Posterity to this fond Passion of the King's for a Destructive Grandeur on the other Side of the Water.

We find yet another Circumstance which gave our Fore-fathers great Pain, and that was the Subsidies, which some of their Monarchs thought fit to pay to foreign Princes, in order to serve them as Auxiliaries. *Edward I.* paid the Nobility of *Brabant*, an annual Subsidy of thirty thousand pounds, to assist him against the *French King*; for the same purpose, he afterwards thought fit to grant 100,000 to the Earl of *Flanders*; no less than a Million to the Earl of *Guilders*, and 1,600,000 to the Duke of *Lorrain*, and all to little or no purpose. *Edward III.* fell into the same Snare, and expended immense Sums of Money with a like View; and so did many others of our Princes, to the great Grief of their Subjects, who frequently complained that they were impoverished to gratify the avaritious Desires of Foreigners, that were never to be satisfied. Such Complaints were sometimes displeasing to our Princes, who could not endure being crossed in their favourite Designs, but this however did not discourage their Subjects, or hinder them from speaking their Minds freely: Thus when *Richard II.* by his strange Management, both of foreign and domesticks Concerns, came to be in such Distress, that he demanded of the House of Commons, a Supply for the Maintenance of his Household, they pleaded extreme Poverty in Barr to his Relief, complaining that all good Money was transported abroad, and that they were forced to make shift with what was debased to carry on the little Trade they had at Home; that by his fruitless War, the Price of Wool was fallen, to their utter Impoverishment; they added that the King's Wants were occasioned by the Ill-

management

management of his Revenue, and therefore they demanded in the first Place, that his present Offices should be removed, consenting at last to tax themselves, with this Limitation, that their Money should be received, expended, and accounted for to themselves, and by Treasurers of their own Election. Such are the Precedents transmitted to us by former Times, such in Days of Yore was the Spirit of the *English* Nation, such were the Rights they assumed, as derived to them by the Constitution, that very Constitution which we still enjoy. Some Favourers and Flatterers of a Court may possibly treat these as old musty Remarks, drawn out of mouldy Records, to stir up Sedition and Discontent. But whatever they may say, I think it my Duty to remark that it was by these Steps our Fore-fathers maintained their Freedom, and transmitted to us the Liberties we now enjoy. It is most true they were not themselves constantly possessed of them, but there never was a Time in which they did not claim them, nor was it said in the Petition of Right to King *Charles I.* or in the Bill of Rights which passed soon after the Revolution, that these were new Privileges granted to, or extorted by the People; but they are expressly confessed to have been always theirs, and those Laws are declaratory only of the Liberties transmitted to us from the most ancient Times.

The Ballance of Power in *Europe*, though perhaps that specific Phrase might not be used, was an old ministerial Scheme, for engaging the People to part with their Money, without telling them that the King, besides the Expences of his Government, from which they enjoyed Protection, expected large Sums out of their Pockets to gratify his Ambition; For preventative Wars, like preventative Physick, have rarely had any other Effect
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with us, than to stir Ill-humours, and so add Factions at Home to Broils abroad. It must however be admitted, that even our wisest and most cautious Princes have not been unattentive to the Affairs of the Continent, but then their Attention has never drawn them into Wars, but on the contrary proved the Means of keeping their Neighbours out of them ; whereas Princes, of another Character, who were fond of Parade, and never thought themselves Monarchs so much as when they had an Army for their Retinue, have lived in a continual Bustle, and brought both themselves, and their Subjects to the deepest Distress ; for we may lay it down as a Thing certain, that this Nation has always thriven by Peace, and suffered by War, except where it has been made in Defence of our just Rights, and chiefly by a Naval Force. To lay this down as my Opinion, is doing Nothing ; to enter into a long Historical Detail in support of what I have said, would be imposing a needless, as well as tedious Task upon the Reader ; to avoid therefore both Errors, I shall content myself with a few Remarks upon three of the most considerable Reigns, in our History, which will fully demonstrate the Doctrine for which I plead, to be as well supported by Experience, as it is visibly founded on Reason ; and I beseech the Reader to consider, what the Consequence must be of Measures irreconcilable to neither, supported only by bold Assertions, and florid Declarations, which when examined to the bottom, are found to be repugnant to both.

Henry VII. was justly stiled the *English Solomon*, and a most wise Prince he was, in whatever Light we consider him. He united the Lines of *York* and *Lancaster*, and became thereby the Founder of a new Family. He reformed our Constitution,
and

and by opening to the Commons an Highway to Property, became the Author of our Liberties, as in the moderate Demands he made, through the Course of his long Reign, he shewed himself the Father of his Subjects. He shewed his Power by arming once against *France*, and his Wisdom by accepting a certain Advantage, to lay down his Arms, rather than risk an uncertain War. He contracted Alliances with all foreign States, and punctually fulfilled them; he declared himself the Patron of Sciences and Commerce, and he effectually encouraged both. Under his Auspice, it was the famous *Cabot* discovered *Newfoundland* and *North-America*; but though this wise Prince neglected nothing that might redound either to the particular Advantage of his Family, or to the general good of his Subjects, yet he prudently avoided foreign Wars, and contented himself with becoming the Arbiter of *Europe*, by aggrandizing his own Kingdom, through the laudable Arts of a steady Policy, which preserved his People for many Years in profound Peace. It is indeed objected to his Memory, that he was too thirsty a Prince; happy Objection! when shall we see it made again? It is likewise said, that he put penal Statutes too strictly in execution, which our celebrated Historian the famous Lord *Herbert* of *Cherbury*, tells us brought a severe, and arbitrary Judgment, on the Instruments of his Oppression *Empson* and *Dudley*. There is some Truth in the former, for desiring to live on his own Revenue, he endeavoured to make the most of it, and therefore resumed many of the Offices which had been granted by *Edward IV.* and *Richard III.* But the latter is absolutely false, as the Reader may see in the Lord Chief Justice *Anderson's* Reports, where

where we have the Record of *Empson's* Conviction at large; which proves that this crafty Lawyer was hit by an Indictment, drawn by one of his own Profession, and found guilty by a common Jury; and yet this mighty Revenue with all these Arts, was raised no higher than £120,000 a Year, as appears from a stated Account of *Dudley's*, which is yet in being. Out of this Revenue, besides what he expended in building the famous Chappel at *Westminster*, and his noble Palace at *Richmond*, he left behind him a Treasure, which considering the Age he lived in, if we had not so many great Authorities agreeing in the Account, we could scarce be brought to credit, since it amounted to no less, than Four Millions and an Half in ready Money.

His Son and Successor *Henry VIII.* pursued quite a different Conduct, he was a more bustling though not a more active Prince than his Father, and so fond of holding the Ballance of Power, that he would needs have a Finger in every Quarrel, that happened throughout *Europe*; he raised ten times as much upon his Subjects as his Father had done, besides squandering away all the Treasure he left him, and this chiefly by assisting foreign Princes, from one vain-glorious Motive or other. Thus pretty early in his Reign, he remitted vast Sums for the use of the Emperor *Maximilian*, to enable him to become Master of the City of *Verona* in *Italy*, by which wise Conduct his Minister, Cardinal *Wolsey*, tells us, *nullum aliud factum, nisi Damnum & Dedecus peperit*, nothing accrued to him but Loss, and Dishonour; for when the Emperor had got the City, he not only gave it up to the King of *France*, but threatened to join with that King against his Benefactor *Henry*, believing as Cardinal

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Wolsey

Wolsey says in the same Letter, that as his Majesty had been formerly persuaded, so now he might be bullied out of his Money, by Huffing and hard Words. Yet he persisted for many Years in the same Sort of Measures, plundering his Subjects at Home, that he might make a mighty Figure abroad, 'till at last, though he was still dreadful here, he became so ridiculous there, that an *Italian* Wit drew him in the middle of a Triangle, with *Moses*, *Christ* and *Mahomet*, at the three Corners, with these Words proceeding by a Label out of his Mouth, *Quo me veritam nescio*, which Way to turn me I know not; as if after all the stir he had made about Religion, he would have turned *Jew*, nay *Turk*, to have got rid of his Necessities. Yet this Monarch did not want Parts, or good Privy-Councillors, but his hasty, boisterous, tyrannical Temper kept them all so much in Awe, that to gratify his Humour, they sacrificed their own Judgments, and which was infinitely worse, sacrificed the Good of their Country.

His Daughter *Elizabeth* inherited her Grand-Cather's Virtues, without being tainted with her Father's Vices, she came to the Crown not only from a private Condition, but from a Prison, where one could scarce have imagined she had studied the Art of Government; she found the Nation in most wretched Circumstances, distressed and impoverished at Home, and at the same Time engaged in a War abroad, in Support of an Interest opposite to her own. Her Finances were not only exhausted, but the Strength of the Nation so impaired, that there was not a Fortress in a Condition of Defence, or a Squadron of Ships fit for Service. Besides all this she had a Pretender to her Crown, with a very plausible Title,

Title, to which a great Part of her Subjects were much affected, and the most potent Prince on the Continent first a suspected Friend, and in Time an open Enemy ; yet from all these Difficulties she delivered herself, with very little Assistance from her Subjects, and by that Time she had reigned ten Years, had saved £700,000, which served her when she came to be involved in very great and withal unavoidable Expences. She was obliged to interfere with the Affairs of her Neighbours, to prevent the Ruin of her own, she sent a great deal of Money into *Scotland*, but then she kept the Nation in constant dependance ; she assisted the *Dutch*, but would not take Words in full Payment, she was pleased perhaps that they owed upon their Coin, the very being of their State to the Favour of God and the Assistance of Queen *Elizabeth*, but she took for all that cautionary Towns by Way of Pawn for £800,000 which she had lent them. She expended upwards of £400,000 in elevating the House of *Bourbon*, but then she did it to raise a Competitor to *Philip II.* of *Spain*, who had often attempted the Conquest of her Dominions. In the midst of these dangerous Wars, and prodigious Expences, she was truly a Mother to her People, and in the strictest Sense of the Word, the Mistress of her Ministers; she humbled the Pride of the haughty *Dudley*, and as appears from his own Letters could never be made the Dupe even of *Cecil's* Cunning. In short she was in every Respect a Queen ; when the Necessities of the State required it, she asked her Subjects for Money without Ceremony, and it was given her without Grumbling. Once it fell out, that the supposed Necessity blew over, after the Money was raised, but she was too wise a Woman to

pocket it, she made a better use of it, she returned it to her Subjects. In all her long and glorious Reign, she received by Grants from Parliament not quite Three Millions. Such was that Princess who lived the Delight and Wonder of her own Age, as her Reign, and her Government must be the Astonishment of ours. Such were the Measures by which she secured Safety to herself, Honour to her Subjects, and at the same Time preserved the Ballance of Power in *Europe*, without being a Dupe to Foreigners.

The great and general Complaint almost of every Writer, who has touched the Reign of her Successor, is that he was no Hero. He spent a great deal of Money in the Cause of his Son-in-Law, the Elector *Palatine*, but he did not care to engage the Nation in a War, with the House of *Austria*, upon his Account; his Negotiations with *Spain* were ill conducted, how well soever they might be attended; and his intermeddling in *Holland*, about the Election of Divinity Professors, appears as justly ridiculous to us, as perhaps some Acts of our own may look in the Eyes of Posterity. But with all the Faults and Failings of this pacifick, or if you will, this pusillanimous Prince, yet under his Reign, it was that our Trade extended to all Parts of the World, and the Commons of *England* grew rich. These are Facts that cannot be disputed, if we rely upon those Authorities, or give Credit to such Testimonies, as would convince us in any other Case. For if we look into that great Collection of Voyages, that was made by Dr. *Purchas*, we shall there find that almost every beneficial Branch of Trade, with which the Nation is now blessed, was attempted, if not settled at this Time; and it has been long ago observed that the Wealth ac-

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cruing from hence, occasioned in a great Measure those Heats in Parliament, which disturbed his Government. It was therefore no bad Advice that his Ministers gave, to avoid foreign Wars during these domestic Distractions. They saw plainly to what the Humour of the People tended, and rightly judged that the Eagerness which some expressed for War abroad was founded in the Hopes of turning it to the Advantage of their Faction at Home; this appeared more plainly afterwards, when many of our martial Nobility and Gentry, who had been trained up in the Wars in *Germany*, threw themselves into the Parliament Army.

King *Charles I.* found a War with *Spain* ready prepared for him, when he came to the Crown, with an empty Exchequer, and his Kingdom full of Fears, Jealousies and Discontents; he embarked soon after in a *French* War, and endeavoured to make himself popular by giving Assistance to the *French* Protestants, but failed in part and in the whole; for he was neither able to do them good, or persuade his own Subjects that he heartily intended it; though it appears from the Duke of *Roban's* Memoirs, who was best able to discern, and most likely to speak Truth, that the King was extremely earnest in the Affair, and would have effectually succoured the Protestants, if he had either had better Ministers, or more obedient Subjects. But it so happened that not only in this, but in another Instance, when by fitting a great Fleet to Sea, he disappointed a Scheme entered into by the *French* and *Dutch* for dividing the *Spanish Netherlands*, he not only disturbed his own Quiet, but provoked his Neighbours to seek Revenge, which was all be not by interfering with Affairs on the Continent. *Buckingham's*

ingham's languid Administration ruined him, that Favourite's Fondness for his own Family, the Notions he had infused into the King's Head, that all who disliked his Measures were Enemies to the King's Authority, drew his Majesty to act in such a Manner, as if he had preferred being Protector of the *Buckingham* Faction, to the being King of three great Nations. At last he saw his Error in some Measure, but took an odd Way of amending it; he raised *Wentworth*, the warmest Persecutor of his late Minister, to the same envied Height of Power, which drove the Party he left from Discontent to Disaffection; they opposed and misrepresented every thing the King did, libelled him as a Friend to Popery and *France*, while themselves were deep in *French* and Popish Intrigues. They were continually representing all the Errors of his Government in the strongest Lights, and made use of his Inclination to be well with his Subjects, to strip him of his just Prerogatives, and to overturn the Ballance of our Constitution. All this could never have happened if he had studied the Preservation of Peace, and living within the Compass of his Revenue, from the Time he ascended the Throne, and either taken in, as was once proposed, all the Patriot Chiefs, or had never taken off *Wentworth*, whose enterprising Genius prov'd the King's Ruin, and his own; leaving thereby a most instructive Lesson to future Kings and Ministers.

The next Government that was settled in *England* was that of the Parliament, and though no Man has a greater Abhorrence than I, for that unnatural Rebellion, to which they owed their Power, yet I must sincerely profess that they managed so wisely, and for the short Time they held

held it, made their Country much more considerable, than it ever was before, chiefly by their steady Conduct in respect to foreign Affairs; they courted indifferently the Friendship and Alliance of all the Princes and States of *Europe*, and at the same time shewed a noble Resolution to do themselves Justice, against any that either questioned their Authority, or attempted to distress their Subjects. This it was that induced them to bear so much as they did with *Spain*, where their Ambassador had been murdered, because they knew the Consequence of the *Spanish* Trade to *India*; and this prompted them to exert themselves so vigourously against the *Dutch*, notwithstanding the low State of their Marine, at the time that War began. Their Success was the Effect of their Heroic Resolution, and that Zeal with which they applied themselves to the providing effectually whatever was necessary for the publick Service. But the Ambition of *Cromwell*, and the insatiable Avarice of some principle Commanders in their Army, soon put an End to their Government, and set up that of a single Person, without any Colour of Right, but what he derived from his Power over his Soldiers. The Protector *Oliver* acted upon Principles opposite to those of the Parliament; for whereas they studied the Nation's Interest, he pursued his own. The Figure he made in *Europe* was entirely owing to the Conduct of the Parliament, and when he came to govern alone, he acted worse than any of our Princes had ever done; for he stript the People at Home of every sort of Liberty, while he sacrificed their Interest abroad to those of his Tyranical Government, and upstart Family. He entered into a War with *Spain*, in order to plunder her Colonies, and he failed in this Design,

sign by refusing the Soldiers and Sailors their Share in the Plunder, which was absolutely the Cause of their shameful Behaviour in *Hispaniola*. He concurred in raising the Power of *France* to such a Height, as it could never otherwise have arrived at, and furnished *Mazarine* with the Means of humbling the House of *Austria* to such a Degree, as hath intailed upon us all the Expence we have since been at, to support that Family against *France*. In short, we owe either to his want of Knowledge, or to his want of Honesty, all the Confusions that followed in *Europe*, as we owe to his overturning the Power of the Parliament, the Loss of that supreme Authority, to which they would have raised this Nation, in respect to its Neighbours; for they had a just Notion of the Ballance of Power, and knew how to have held the Scales, even without that haughty Air of dictating to all they had any Concerns with, which was his great failing, and from which, notwithstanding by an unaccountable Partiality, he derives most of his Reputation.

I wish the curious and impartial Reader would examine this Matter carefully, for I dare assure him, that these Observations are founded on Facts, and that they are not made with a View of serving any Party, or to prejudice any System, but purely if the Thing be practicable to come at Truth. Yet to open the Matter a little further, let me observe that in all this Period of Time, if we except it may be Ten Years, we were gaining immense Sums by Trade; for from the Peace with *Spain*, in the Beginning of the Reign of King *James*, to the Year 1641, we were mostly in Peace, and exported vast Quantities of our Commodities and Manufactures into all Parts of the World; and for the short Wars in which we
were

were engaged, though they weakened the Government they did not much diminish the Strength of the Nation, for they were managed by our Fleets, the Expences of which passing only from Hand to Hand amongst ourselves, could not greatly hurt the Nation; and even for our civil Wars, they did not until within the two or three last Years occasion much detriment to our Commerce. And to shew that I am absolutely impartial, and have not the least Inclination to misrepresent any Government, that has subsisted in this Island, I will readily admit, that the immediate Mischief of *Cromwell's* ill-grounded War with *Spain*, was in some Measure ballanced by the Money brought into the Nation by Admiral *Montague*; but at the same time I insist it was ballanced only in Part, for the great Blow given by *Blake* to the *Spaniards*, hurt us as much as it did them, though it certainly raised the Reputation of our Maritime Power, and is deservedly reckoned the boldest Action that ever was performed by the *Englist* Navy. It was in those Days computed, that besides the Silver we took, the *Spaniards* lost between 7 and 8,000,000*l.* Sterling, of which according to the Course of our Trade before the War, we must have received upwards of 3,000,000*l.* beside, this so weakened the House of *Austria*, that she never afterwards recovered it, which brought great Expences upon us, from our being obliged to defend her Dominions in the *Netherlands*. To evince the Truth of this, I shall presently produce from the Records of the Mint, an Account of the Money coined within this Period, which will put the Matter out of Question; but before I do this, I beg leave to make some further Observations. The Mischief occasioned by *Cromwell's* War

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with *Spain*, was not only felt in the Loss of our Trade with that Nation, in the taking of our Ships by *Spaniards*, and of Privateers under their Colours, by the Weakening the House of *Austria*, and Strengthening the House of *Bourbon*, but also by the entire Loss of so large a Sum as 7,000,000*l.* in Silver, to the whole trading World; so that this wrong-headed Notion of distressing the *Spaniards* brought irreparable Damage to us, and to the rest of the trading Nations in *Europe*, with whom the whole of that Sum must in Time have been laid out, and have continued to circulate to this Time; besides we had then a large Ballance of Trade, arising from the particular Ballances of most Nations we dealt with, and as they drew the Silver, with which they paid these Ballances, from *Spain*, we must have been considerable Losers in our general Trade, as well as by the peculiar Detriment we suffered from not having our Share of that Money, to which our direct Trade with *Spain* might have intitled us. These are Points that deserve to be considered, because I doubt we are yet too much of Opinion, that in all Wars, the Damage done to the Enemy is just so much gained to ourselves, whereas a Multitude of unforeseen Accidents may render it otherwise, and as in the present Case, make the Enemies Loss our own too. For as the Trade of any Nation cannot be driven to Advantage, without a certain Quantity of current Cash, so the Trade of *Europe*, and indeed of the Universe, requires in like Manner a proportionable quantity of Bullion, the lessening of which must be attended with the same Inconveniences, as the lessening the Quantity of running Cash in any particular Nation. On the whole therefore I say that our living so great a Part of this Period in profound Peace,

Peace, our concerning ourselves but little with the Affairs on the Continent, and sending abroad scarce any Money upon that Account, prove the Means of our obtaining a great Ballance of Trade in our Favour, which brought annually considerable Sums of Gold and Silver into this Country, the Proportion of which, if not the exact Quantity, may be gathered from our Coinage, which, for Reasons I have not Room to mention here, was very regular, all that Time, serving in this Respect as a commercial Barometer, by which the Strength and the Wealth of the Nation might be easily measured; and now therefore I come to that Account, which I have promised during this Space of Time,

*An Account of the Money coined in England,
for Fifty Eight Years.*

	<i>l.</i>	<i>s.</i>	<i>d.</i>
From October 1599, to March 1619.	4,779,314	13	4
From March 1619, to March 1638.	6,900,042	11	1
From March 1638, to March 1657.	7,733,521	13	4
	19,412,878	17	9

After the Restoration of King Charles II. the Conduct of the Court of Great Britain, had a very great Influence upon all the Affairs of Europe. This was extremely well understood by the famous Earl of Clarendon, who though censured by Bishop Burnet, for interfering too much in foreign Affairs, yet we who live at a greater

Distance from his Times, and consequently are better able to discern how far his Maxims were founded in Truth and Experience, and how far they were justified or condemned by Events, are bound to think in another Manner; for in the first Place, it is very certain that the Earl opposed the Sale of *Dunkirk* to the *French*, though he was one of the Commissioners impowered to treat for it, because he foresaw that this would raise a Clamour at Home, and strengthen the Hands of the *French* King abroad. His Scheme of Politicks was founded on a very few Maxims, from which he thought there was no deviating without Danger. He was desirous of maintaining as long, and as far as it was possible a general Peace, and for entering into such Alliances, as might restrain the *French* Power, without exhausting our own. From these Motives he opposed the first *Dutch* War, in that Reign, because, how just soever the Grounds of it might be, his Sentiments were that the Maritime Powers ought always to live in the strictest Unity. After that War was concluded, and the Earl of *Clarendon* banished, the King for some time managed his own Affairs, and for the Space of Fifteen Months was esteemed by all *Europe* the greatest, wisest, and honestest Prince that ever filled the *British* Throne. For in that Space of Time, viz. in *January* 1668, he concluded the famous tripple Alliance, by which in Conjunction with the States-General, and the Crown of *Sweden*, he set Bounds to the Ambition of *France*, and effectually secured the Peace of *Europe*: Yet all the Force mentioned in this Treaty to be furnished on either Side, was no more than Forty Men of War of different Rates, 6000 Foot, and 400 Horse, or an Equivalent for them in Money.

ney. So long as this Treaty subsisted, he was a powerful and a happy Prince. But when by the Acts of *France*, and the Caballing of his own Subjects he was drawn from it, he ceased thence forward to be either a great or a happy King, and spent his Life in continual uneasiness. The War of 1672, though it might not be groundless, was most certainly infamous, since he thereby sacrificed the Interests of his Subjects, and the Liberties of *Europe*, to gratify his Resentments. He acted in this upon *Cromwell's* Motives, and with the same execrable View, that is, he endeavoured to establish an arbitrary Authority by the Assistance of *France*, and in order to this acted in direct Repugnance to the Rules of right Policy, as well as against the Inclination of his Subjects. But the King was then in the Hands of the very worst Ministry, with which this Nation was ever curst, a Crew of renegado Patriots, who had opposed the King, while he acted upon right Principles, and had ruined by their Arts the best Minister the Nation ever had. These Men had forced themselves into Power, and endeavoured to preserve it by flattering him with a Scheme of absolute Authority. As they had served their Country without Sincerity, so now they served the King without Loyalty; and when from a Foresight of the Mischiefs their mad Management would have brought upon him, his Majesty refused to go their Lengths, *Buckingham* and *Shaftsbury* turned Patriots again, that is to say pretended to be so, and perplexed his Affairs as long as he and they lived. By this strange Conduct, by this Want of Steadiness, by his minding Pleasure too much, and Business too little, the King lost the Confidence of his Subjects, and Allies, and thenceforward fell into a Dependence
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on *France*, which was not only contrary to his Interest, but far enough from being agreeable to his Inclinations. This led him to think of governing by Corruption, the meanest and most dangerous Method an *English* Monarch can ever pursue, and which sooner or later has been and will be the Ruin of every Prince who is drawn to it. Instead of consulting his Parliament as the free Representatives of his People, he endeavoured by Places and Pensions, to make them the Creatures of his Will, and the Supporters of an illegal Power, by which he destroyed his own Credit and theirs, which will be everlastingly the Case of any Prince who acts upon such Maxims.

But it so fell out, that there was at that Time too great a Portion of public Spirit for him to subdue. Some of the Members who had been his best Friends, and that too from Principle, revolted; particularly Sir *Thomas Clarges*, Brother-in-Law to the Duke of *Albemarle*, who insisted in Parliament on seeing public Money fairly accounted for, which raised such an Opposition as all the Weight of the Crown, all the Intrigues of its Ministers, and all the Influence of both King and Ministers, could never conquer. This produced such Restrictions as put it out of the Power of the Court, to pursue either foreign or domestick Schemes for establishing arbitrary Power, with any Success; this obliged the King, to live upon pretty good Terms with the *Dutch*, whether he would or not, and defeated his Conjunction with the *French* in spite of his Teeth: which put him out of Love with Parliaments, as that raised a Spirit of Disaffection, that ended in the Destruction of his Family. Yet this Situation of Affairs as it had some ill, so it had many good Effects, with Regard to the Nation. On the one Hand, the

he King was restrained from acting as he inclined to do, at least during some Part of his Reign, in Favour of *France* ; and on the other Hand, it kept the Nation from launching too far into Wars upon the Continent, about the Concerns of other People, for which even at that time, there were some who had too warm an Inclination. It obliged his Majesty to great Circumspection in his Conduct, and perhaps constrained him to do many Things that were highly for the Benefit of his Subjects ; such as sending strong Fleets into the *Mediterranean*, and forcing the pyratrical States of *Barbary* into Treaties, that have secured our Commerce ever since. By these Methods the publick Revenue was kept within just Bounds, and Ministers were compelled to make up fair Accounts ; the Money of the Nation was kept at Home, for except a very few Subsidies during the *Dutch Wars*, we did not feed the Avarice of such Princes as make a Market of their People. It secured to us an extensive and beneficial Trade, and as we had then no great standing Army, no formidable Number of Officers belonging to the Revenue, no publick Debts or Taxes out of the Reach of Parliamentary Inspection, the Nation grew immensely rich, as appears from the rising of the Customs, for as these had been farmed at 400,000*l.* in the Year after the Restoration ; which in the last Year of Queen *Elizabeth* had been let for 36,000*l.* so before the Death of King *Charles II.* they arose to 800,000*l.* which shews how much Trade was improved in so little a Time, our Navy was greatly increased, and the Tonnage of our trading Ships doubled, according to the Computations of Dr. *Davenant*, who likewise says that our Coin was encreased four Millions and a Half, which shews what a mighty Ballance of Trade

Trade must have been all this Time in our Favour; and yet I think I may be justified in saying that during his whole Reign, there was not one Year with another above a Million and a Half raised upon the Nation by Authority of Parliament, and yet, as we have already seen, the Affairs of the Continent were not neglected, the Power of *France* was in a good Measure restrained, and the Treaty of *Nimeguen*, made under King *Charles's* Mediation, fixed the Tranquility of *Europe*, upon as just and lasting a Foundation as any laid for it by future Alliances.

I shall not pretend to give any Account of the Politicks of the next Reign, they are but too well known already. King *James* notwithstanding the Experience he might have reaped, from his Brother's Misfortunes, entered into a close Conjunction with *France*, which, to speak fairly and impartially, was his Ruin. If he did it from religious Views, he certainly sacrificed his political Interests. If his Endeavours to extend his Prerogative to protect and promote Papists, to make use of corrupt Lawyers, to weaken and decide away the Constitution of this Kingdom, which is, and ought to be as much a Rule to the King, as to the Subjects, if I say he made the Revolution necessary at Home, his Complaisance for *France* produced the Means of accomplishing it abroad, not only by engaging *Holland*, but the Emperor, *Spain*, and some of the Princes and States of *Germany*, to concur in bringing it about, which they would never have done, let our civil or religious Grievances been what they would, if he had had any just Notions of the Ballance of Power in *Europe*. In this Respect he was truly infatuated, for he not only disobliged his natural Allies,

Allies, but even the Pope himself, by following the *French* King's Councils : So that it is no wonder, that a Prince who employ'd the small Time he sat upon the Throne, in driving his Subjects into Disaffection, and who lost the Hearts of his Army, by a foolish Partiality for *Irish* Papists, and at the same Time compelled the Powers on the Continent, to prefer their own Preservation to those general Principles of good Neighbourhood, which form the Law of Nations, should lose his Dominions, and be driven in his old Age to eat the Bread of his Betrayal, and to live an Exile in that Country, to which he had sacrificed his own. All this was but very natural, and his Brother King *Charles* had foreseen it, which made him resolve, if he had lived, to have thrown off all Respect for *France*, and to have aimed at recovering the Hearts of his Subjects, and the true Reins of Government, which he had in a Manner lost by his Mistakes. But though King *James* was so unhappy as not to profit by his Brother's Example, yet we have reason to hope that his Fate will be a warning to all future Kings. If had known how to have contented himself with a moderate Share of Power, with an ample Revenue, and the reasonable Obedience of his People; if he had consulted their Interest only; if he, who understood Trade, as well as ever Prince did, had cultivated such foreign Alliances as were necessary to secure it; he might have reigned long and happily over a great and free People, he might have held the Ballance of Power, and he might have given an equitable Law to *Europe*. But this unlucky Prince, in part misguided by his own Inclinations, in part misled by the artificial Flatteries of a subtle Minister, who meant, and who accomplished his Ruin, would needs depart

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from the ordinary Maxims of Government, deduced from, not to say prescribed by, our Constitution, and hoped sometimes by closeting Members, at others by awing them, by distributing Places of Power and Profit amongst his Creatures, by keeping up a large standing Army, and by making all the use he could of the Influence of his Revenue to establish a new Sort of Government, that he might bring back an old Superstition ; but he found to his Cost, that an *English* Monarch, who will not be the King of his People, has Revenues, Armies and Fleets in vain ; and that when in his Imagination he is strongest, and nearest his Purpose, he is in the greatest Danger of being nothing at all.

We are now come to that Period of Time, in which we launched out such immense Sums for the carrying on a foreign War, I mean after, and in Support of the Revolution ; it was justly and prudently foreseen, by such as came then into the Management of Affairs, that to raise such Sums as were wanting, by the ordinary Methods, and within the Compass of the current Year, was a Thing not practicable, especially considering the Ease the People had enjoyed under the two last Reigns. There was a mighty Difference between raising two Millions, and more than Five ; and therefore there was no Difficulty in finding out, that some Slight was necessary to prevent the Peoples feeling it ; our Ministers hit upon that very readily ; instead of creating Funds sufficient for the Service of the War, they created Funds for raising the Interest of such Sums, as might be necessary for that Purpose, which, besides the great End of raising Money, without the Peoples being sensible of it, answered many other Ends of almost equal Importance. In the
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first Place it introduced a new Trade, I mean of Stock-Jobbing, in which the Friends of the Government dealt to very great Advantage. It enabled the Ministry, by having these advantageous Lights in their Power, to draw off Numbers, who would otherwise have opposed them, by bartering private Advantage in exchange for Publick Spirit. It afforded an Opportunity for augmenting the Officers of the Revenue, for creating a Multitude of new Posts, and thereby enlarging the Power of the Crown, by means more effectual, and at the same Time far less invidious, than the old Way of the Prerogative. It likewise contributed not a little to the strengthening of the Government; for as the monied Interest by degrees came to be deeply engaged, so of Consequence abundance of wealthy People were attached from the Consideration of their Fortunes, more firmly, than they could have been any other Way, to the new System. I might proceed to reckon up many more Advantages but these are sufficient to shew what the true Motives were, upon which the Government went in establishing this Method of raising Money, so strange to our Constitution, and which in a Course of Time, has in a Manner new moulded it; and all built upon this single Principle of the Necessity of reducing the Power of *France*, and preserving the Ballance of *Europe*.

To place this perplexed Subject in the clearest Light possible, it will be proper to observe, what the Pretences were for making this extraordinary Change; since it would be absurd to imagine, that if any of the Motives before-mentioned, had been insisted on to the Representatives of the People, they would ever have consented to such a Change, because so manifestly to the Prejudice of

their Constitutents, and because the Weight of Influence was not as yet grown strong enough to introduce such a Change, without plausible Pretences. In the first Place then, it was alledged, that this Method was in reality an Ease to the People, since it enabled them to carry on a necessary War, without levying upon them, immediately, more then they were able to pay. It was in the next Place said, that as the War would be but of a short Continuance, and great Advantages would accrue to the Nation by the Peace, it would be an easy Thing to discharge the Debts contracted during the War, when the Nation was least able to pay, by larger Impositions after the Peace, when by the Increase of Trade the People would be in a better Condition to bear them. Now that these Principles were mistaken, if not fallacious, I shall make appear in very few Words. Dr. *Davenant* in his Discourses on the publick Revenues and Trade of *England*, observes, that the Revenue of the Crown in 1688 was about two Millions. The House of Commons, in an Address to Queen *Anne*, presented *February* 12, 1702, inform her, that from *November* 5, 1688, to *March* 8, 1701, the Sum of 45,568,725*l.* 19*s.* 2*d.* $\frac{1}{4}$ *qr.* (a Sum never known to be raised in very many Reigns before) had been levied on the Subject, and issued out of the Exchequer for the Service of the late War, to Paymasters and Treasurers. But as it is certain, that a very large Part of this Expence was induced by the Manner of raising it, and by the Additions of Premiums and Discounts, it may very well be computed, that the whole Expence of the War, might have been carried on by an additional Levy of 4,000,000*l.* *per Annum*, and so the whole Expence on the People raised from two

to six Millions; and that this might have been very well borne, or at least much more easily, than the Method that was taken, appears from hence, that at the Close of the War, Dr. *Davenant*, in the Work before cited, computes the Revenue, than necessary, at 5,355,472*l.* upon which he makes the following very judicious Reflection.

*It may be here said, that if we pay above Five Millions per Annum, our Condition is not bettered by the Peace; but such as argue this Way do not consider, that if the War was continued, for Example, this Year, besides the annual Payment of 3,300,000*l.* from the Funds now existing, there must have been raised for the Fleet and Army 5,000,000*l.* in the whole 8,300,000*l.* that is to say, there might have been levied, within the Year, about five Millions, and for the Rest we must have run into a new Debt.*

This Observation strengthens two of mine to Demonstrations. For first I say, that if we were able to raise upwards of Five Millions at the close of the War, we must have been much better able to have raised Six at the Beginning, especially, if it be considered, that at the End of the War, we should have been discharged of Four, and therefore the Pretence of easing the People, was a mere Pretence, invented to cover the secret Designs of those, who had in View the establishing the Power of the Government, that is their own; for the Author of *Faction detected*, tells us plainly, that by Revolution Principles, we are to understand a perpetual Whig Administration. I say, Secondly, that the latter Pretence was as ill founded, or to speak more exactly, was as void of Foundation as the former; for it appears, by the foregoing Calculations, which I will venture to
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say are the best that can be had, that at the End of the War we were obliged to raise 5,355,472*l.* and yet had a Debt of between Seventeen and Eighteen Millions, and a Necessity upon us, if the War had continued, of raising the next Year 8,300,000*l.* Judge then, what Probability there was of paying the Debt contracted in the War, by new Impositions, during a Time of Peace; and judge from Experience, I mean by Experience of later Times, how far this Kind of reasoning was then, or ever will be worthy of Credit. I do not say this to discredit King *William's* Government, or to hurt the Reputation of his Ministers; for if the System laid down in *Faction Detected*, was the System they went upon, undoubtedly they acted right, for the Methods they pursued, plainly raised, as they have since most effectually supported, that System. But it is a different Case with Respect to the Point I am labouring, which is to shew the Consequences that this Change had, with Regard to the Circumstances of the Inhabitants of these Nations; for though I profess myself to have a due Respect for the Whigs, yet (with their Permission) I acknowledge that I have a much deeper Concern for my Country.

But these Mischiefs, however considerable, are yet nothing in Respect to another, which is but little attended to, and that is the Opportunity, which the Creation of this artificial Wealth affords of running the Nation into a monstrous Expence, by which private Men may indeed be Gainers, but the Public must suffer deeply, though silently and imperceptibly. For there was this Difference, between the Foreign War carried on after the Revolution, and all the Wars carried on before it, that we never felt a Distress proportionable

tionable to the Expence it cost us, and therefore the Bulk of the Nation were not at all sensible of the Danger of running into such a War again; and as this Method has been pursued ever since, we have gone on increasing, in all outward appearance, in Trade and Riches, which has given Countenance to the mighty Demands made upon us, for the Support of the Ballance of Power, when in reality we have been in a Condition least able to comply with them; and as this is a Matter of the last Importance, as it is indeed the one Thing necessary to be understood, I hope the Reader will bear with me, if I lay out a large proportion of my own Time, and take up some of his, in order thoroughly to explain it.

It is a thing very evident, that the Increase and Decrease of Coin and Bullion, are the true Signs of a flourishing or decaying State of any Nation; and the Reason is plainly this, because if the Inhabitants of any Country live within Bounds, their Frugality, with a reasonable Proportion of Industry, must necessarily draw great Sums of Money into that Country, by various Channels; whereas if any People through Luxury, Idleness, or foreign Wars run into such Expences, as they cannot afford, the Consequence must be, that as a Nation they will grow poor, of which the Scarcity of Coin and Bullion will be a certain Mark. This happened frequently in former Reigns, and forced our Princes upon strange Expedients: King *Henry III.* granted Letters Patent to the Archbishop of *York*, to empower him to pawn his Jewels; and the great *Edward I.* granted the like Letters Patent to *Giles Andover*. *Edward III.* pawned his Jewels to pay certain Foreign Mercenaries their Wages, as appears by the close Rolls, in the Tower, of
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the first Year of his Reign ; and *Walsingham* the Historian, tells us, that *Edward* the Black Prince was forced to coin his Plate to pay his Troops. But what is still more extraordinary, *Edward* III. pawned the Imperial Crown of this Realm three Times, as *Henry* V. did once ; and that we may not imagine these are old Stories, and do not concern us, I must take Notice that Queen *Elizabeth*, in the latter Part of her Reign, taking into her princely Consideration, the great Inconveniency that must arise from demanding more Money of her Subjects than they could well spare, chose rather to raise Money upon the Crown Jewels, in order to defray the great Expences she was at in Parts beyond the Seas. I cite these as so many Cases in Point, to shew that foreign Wars, and foreign Negotiations have heretofore reduced us into very distressed Circumstances, since I think it must be taken for granted that the People could do no more, when their Princes were obliged to do so much.

When therefore it was thought requisite to enter so warmly into the Affairs of the Continent, as we did after the Revolution, it was easily foreseen, that any Distress of this Kind would be attended with untoward Consequences, and oblige the Nation to consider the Importance of the War in another Light, than it was thought fit for them to see it; therefore to solve this Difficulty, our *Dutch* Privy-Counsellors introduced a Method, which had been before practised in their Country, and this was creating a Paper-Credit, or rather a Paper-Currency, by which all the uses of Cash were so well answered here at Home, that it became an easy Matter, to transport large Sums abroad, without our feeling the Inconveniencies immediately; and as Practice has rendered this
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more familiar, so we now see that Paper-Currency manages the Trade of the greatest Part of this Island; from whence I know our Politicians imagine we receive mighty Benefits, but which at the same Time, in my Opinion, is attended with some few Inconveniences; for this reason, because if it were otherwise, the Mode of Reasoning used by these Politicians would prove too much, since in the Manner they put it, the more we run in Debt the richer we must be. In Order to remove the Obscurity under which this Subject labours, let us consider,

That our Debts and our Paper will not pay foreign Troops, or even our own in foreign Countries; in order to that there must be real Wealth employ'd, that is such Wealth as hath an intrinsic Value in all Countries; whence it appears, that those Things which pass for the Equivalents with Money at Home, are mere Paper abroad; so that however we may amuse each other, we must pay Foreigners. As long therefore as our Situation engages us either in expensive Wars, or expensive Negotiations, it follows, that there will be a great Drain upon us for Money, but no Call on that side for our Paper. In order to supply this, what do we do? Do we bring in large Quantities of Gold and Silver, that is impossible, Trade only can supply that, and Trade always suffers in Time of actual War, or fluctuating Peace. But what do we do, why we contract fresh Debts, by Means of which an additional Quantity of Paper-Money comes to be circulated, which enables us to part with Gold and Silver, without its being immediately missed. On the whole therefore, the Evil which our Ancestors suffered by Foreign Wars, is not removed but palliated; the Burthen upon us is as great as ever, we have only erected a Column, upon which while we pitch it,

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we do not immediately feel it. But this is not all, let us reflect also,

That the only Way by which one Nation can gain by another, is by bringing that other into such a Situation as to oblige her to export her Coin and Bullion to you without Resource, by which I mean, for I would have my Readers understand what I mean, as well as what I say, in such a Manner, as that the Nation, so exporting her Coin, may have no demand for it again, in any Shape whatever. In Order to make this clear, I must have Recourse to Facts. A little after the Restoration, such as looked closely into the Commercial Concerns of this Nation, came to be of Opinion that we carried on too great a Trade with France, notwithstanding this Trade was then carried on entirely in our own Bottoms. The Reason was, because we took too great a Quantity of French Commodities, and paid the Ballance in Coin or Bullion; and therefore it was thought necessary to put a Stop to a Trade which drained us of our Money, and served only to enrich our too powerful Neighbour. But the Dutch, who in Matters of this Nature, are without Dispute, the wisest People in Europe, carry on a losing Trade with us, and that to a much higher Degree than ours ever was with France, and yet they never thought fit to put a stop to it, for this plain Reason, because notwithstanding they pay us a large Ballance in Money, they export the Commodities they take from us, and by that Means repay themselves with Interest. These two Instances fully explain what is meant by exporting Coin and Bullion, and exporting it without Resource. I proceed therefore to the last Consideration, which is,

That by whatever Method a Necessity is created of exporting Money or Bullion out of any Country without Resource, is in the Nature of a losing Trade; so that consequently if a Stop be not put to it, the Nation
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subject to such Drains, must certainly and speedily be undone. For as it is impossible to distinguish the Crown-Piece spent by a Soldier, from the Crown-Piece spent by a Merchant, so it is simply impossible to make any Distinction between the Money carried abroad, by our having the Ballance of Trade against us, and the Money sent abroad to pay or to support foreign Troops, or even to pay or to support our own. I say between these there is absolutely no Distinction but One, and that is, we can with much greater Ease and Certainty put a Stop to the latter, than we can to the former. If therefore a Nation is undone by this, it must be through their own Fault, or that of their Governors, though they may be grievously distressed by that, without any great Failing either in themselves, or their Rulers. For though War be an Evil, and a very great Evil in a trading Country, yet there are Nations, who either from the Bent of their Genius, their Circumstances and Situation, or from their Want of all other Trade, make a Trade of this. It is apparent therefore, that with Respect to these Nations, the Time of War, or at least the Time of Confusion is actually more agreeable, because more beneficial than a Time of settled Peace and Tranquility. It follows, that it can never be the Interest of any of their Neighbour to feed or promote this Humour, because while it turns to the Benefit of these Dealers in War, it must prove the Destruction of such as live in another Way, and procure the Means of living by other and better Methods.

To vindicate the Truth of my Assertions, I might Instance the Republick of *Sparta* amongst the Ancients, and the Canton of *Berne* among the Moderns. The former by declining all other Trades but that of War, drew to themselves the best Part of the Gold and Silver in *Greece*; and if they had not opened a Passage for it by dispen-

sing with the Laws of *Lycurgus*, and departing from their Frugality and martial Measures, they must have engrossed the Power and the Money of that Part of the World, and have prescribed such Terms to their Neighbours, as would have served their Purpose best. As to the Canton of *Berne*, they are at this Hour possessed of a prodigious Treasure, amassed by letting out their Subjects to foreign Princes, and though it serves them only for a Resource in Time of Need, yet it may so far serve us, as it shews the Consequence of furnishing a Nation with Money, from whom there is no getting it again.

These Things being premised, the Reader will very easily conceive, how War comes to be strictly speaking, what I have called it, a Trade in *Germany*. I do not mean by a Trade, simply a Mode of Gain to the Princes who let out their Men for Hire, but a much higher Kind of Trade, a Sort of Commerce, beneficial to the whole Country. For, whatever other People may imagine, I lay it down as a Thing absolutely certain, that the *Germans* are by much the most able Politicians amongst the Moderns. The *Italians* indeed are in some Measure in Possession of that Reputation; but whoever considers that except *Venice* and perhaps *Savoy*, there is not an independant State in *Italy*, and at the same Time reflects that *Great-Britain*, *Sweden*, *Denmark*, and *Tuscany*, are all governed by *German* Princes, and that the Imperial Prince of *Russia* is a *German* likewise, will not think me altogether in the wrong. And this Power of their Princes, has been the Effect of their new Policy, built altogether upon this Maxim, that War by proper Management may be made a Trade. When heretofore the *Hans* Towns flourished in that Country,

Country, they contrived to monopolize Trade; and were so successful in their Contrivances, that no Country could carry on any Trade, without their running away with the best Part of the Profit; the Scene is now changed, most of those great Cities have been swallowed up by the Ambition of the Princes in their Neighbourhood; and it is a Wonder that both Princes and Cities were not swallowed up by the Ambition of *Charles V.* With his Family they struggled for a Time with great Difficulty, but since then they have not only struck out this new Trade of War, but found a Way to make other Nations maintain it. Since the Treaty of *Munster*, all the Wars in *Germany* have been fed by foreign Money. The House of *Austria* was supported by the Riches of *Spain*; and such as opposed the House of *Austria*, by the Wealth of *France*; and in the last general War, when the House of *Austria* had no longer *Spain* to support her, that Deficiency was amply supplied by us, and by the *Dutch*; so that notwithstanding Multitudes of private Persons might be beggared, and particular Provinces might be ruined, that is for a Time, yet *Germany*, or to speak with greater Propriety, the *German* Nation, must have been very considerable Gainers, by the immense Sums of Money poured into their Country by the War.

But to come closer to the Point, let us consider what *Germany* got by the long Train of Negotiations which succeeded the Treaties of *Utrecht* and *Baden*. In the first Place, the late Emperor drew immense Sums from *Italy*, and the Noblemen he sent thither as Vice-roys, Governors, and Generals, returned home again with vast Estates. Yet he bore very little Part of the Expence of that War, supported by the Quadruple Alliance. It appears,

appears by Sir *George Byng's Expedition to Sicily*, that it cost us more, than it did him, to conquer that Kingdom ; and every Body knows into what Condition both *Sicilies* fell, after that they had been but a few Years in the hands of the *Germans*. Before and after that Time, We and the *Dutch* paid very large Subsidies to many of the *German* Princes, for Troops we had no Occasion to employ, so that the whole of those Subsidies were clear Gains to the *Germans*. When *Italy* was drained, and the Maritime Powers did not part from their Coin quite so freely, the Emperor clapt up a Treaty with *Spain*, which as usual was maintained by prodigious Subsidies from that Crown, and subsisted in full Force, as long as *Spain* found Money to pay them ; which made it absolutely necessary for the *Hanover* Allies to open their Purses also, and to send Millions of Florins, in hard Money, into *Germany*; and this too whilst the *Ostend* Company was running away with their Trade, the only Means by which they were enabled to bear such Expences. At last, indeed a War broke out, that was extremely fatal to the House of *Austria*. But why ? Because the Maritime Powers took no Share therein; which shews that it is they support the Expence of general Wars, upon what Principle soever they are drawn into them.

To sum up all, that is necessary to be said, on this Occasion, let us consider what Sums of Money have rolled, from all Sides, into *Germany*, since the Opening of the present War. The *French* make no Scruple of owning, that the very Preparations requisite thereto, I mean the Subsidies granted to the Emperor, and other *German* Princes, and the Money furnished for Magazines, Forage, and other Necessaries before their Troops entered

entered *Germany*, amounted to 5,000,000*l.* Sterling: And yet the late Cardinal *de Fleury* is accused of starving the Cause, notwithstanding these prodigious Remittances. After this the *French* maintained an Army of upwards of 100,000 Men for two Years, which cannot be computed at less than 9,000,000*l.* Sterling. But to prevent any Disputes about this Computation, I am content to throw in all that was spent and lost in Fortifications, Artillery, Military Stores, Baggage, Ransoms, &c. and take the whole at 15,000,000*l.* including also the Subsidies, that were all along paid to the Allies of *France*. To this we are to add, all that it has cost us, the *Dutch*, and the *Czarina*, which I presume will not be thought over calculated at 5,000,000*l.* and then we see what an immense Quantity of Silver and Gold must in the Space of a very few Years have travelled into that Country, from whence I think all the World agrees not a single Shilling is ever like to return. If therefore we reflect upon the Certainty of all this, since I presume nobody imagines that the *Germans* will sell their Country and their Blood for Promises or Paper, and at the same Time considers how many Years are required to bring in such a Sum of ready Money into any Country by the Ballance of Trade, we shall be thoroughly satisfied, that this kind of Militia Commerce is a very compendious Method of collecting Riches; and as the Power of *Germany* is likewise encreased by it, as their Army grows daily more numerous and better disciplined, it may afford some future Prospects, which deserve the serious Attention of our Politicians; by which I mean such Politicians, as study ours, and not the *German* Interest.

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It may be said, and very probable it will be said, that a private Man, who has no other Lights than those afforded him by his Studies, cannot be so proper a Judge of these Matters, as our Statesmen, who may be presumed to have greater Abilities, and who have most certainly more favourable Opportunities of improving them; but to this I answer, that as we are not at present famous for constantly preferring Merit, the Height of a Man's Station ought not to be esteemed the Standard of his Abilities; and on the other Hand, as there have been sometimes great Men who were no Politicians, so perhaps there is no Absurdity in saying, that a Man may be a Politician, though he is not great. Policy like all other Sciences is founded upon Principles, self-evident in themselves, and from which good Sense alone will enable a Man of tolerable Experience to make Deductions; and I presume to say further, that what I have delivered is not only founded on Reason, but is exactly agreeable to Experience; for while we have been either Fighting or Negotiating away our Money, and thereby enriching our Neighbours, the Nation has been growing gradually poorer; for had it been otherwise, we should have lessened, whereas it is but too certain that we have rather increased our Debts. Our Trade may possibly support us, and even pay the Interest of these Debts, 'till we fall into some Method or other of discharging them, which must be done by lessening our publick Expences; but if instead of doing this, which Reason and the invariable Maxims of true Policy point out to us, we suffer ourselves to be talked into the opposite Method by warm Statesmen. There can be nothing more apparent, than that as Queen *Anne's* War, added to the Debt of King *William's*, so the present

sent War, especially in its present Management, will add to the heavy Load that was left upon us by the last; and what the Consequence of this must be, requires no mighty Foresight. We begin already to talk of reducing the Interest of the Funds, which is at the Bottom reducing the Principal; and if we compute the Number of Years between those Reductions, it is pretty much the same Thing, as if our Publick Funds, like our Land Estates were subject to Taxes; for if both are diminished in the same Time, and pretty nearly in the same Proportion, it matters not much whether these Diminutions do, or do not go under different Names, since it comes to the same Thing at last; and private Men find their Properties as effectually lessened one way as the other. All this is, or I have thrown away a great deal of Pains, perfectly plain and clear; and I hope will not be thought the less certain, or less worthy of Notice, for being so.

It will be necessary however in order to render this Treatise more useful and fitter to answer the End for which it was written, to apply the principal Points laid down therein to the present Situation of Affairs; for this I think not only expedient at this Time, but very allowable; by which I mean that it is not only agreeable to the Interest of the Nation, but ought to be so likewise to such as have the Direction of publick Affairs, since nothing can import them more, than that Truth, in such Matters as these, should be rendered so manifest, as not to admit either of Doubt or Evasion. A late Author, who is supposed to be much in Favour with the Great, and to be withal pretty deep in the Secret of their Measures, has taken no small Pains to persuade his Country-Men, that the single Rule of their

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Conduct, should be an Opposition to *France*; so that provided they constantly cross the Designs of that Power, they need never regard what Steps they take, or what Sums the taking those Steps may cost them. This I must confess seems to be very extraordinary Doctrine, and at the same Time such as deserves very serious Consideration; for if this be our true Interest, it is such a one as never Nation had before, and such as no other Nation now professes but ourselves. Yet as extraordinary as it is, I do not think it ought to be condemned without Examination, or a contrary Conduct recommended without Reasons given for its Support, which is what I have attempted in the foregoing Pages; wherein, I presume to say, that I have made it clear from Reason and Experience, from all the Principles of Policy, and all the Lights of History, that the following Points are certain and indisputable Truths, *viz.*

That the Germans, considered as a Nation, have been always extremely attached to their own Interests, and have constantly sacrificed to it whatever Engagements they have entered into with Strangers, upon this Principle, that the Good of their own Country, was the Fundamental Principle of true Politicks, as Self-Preservation is said to be of the Law of Nature, and this is laid down, not with any View of lessening or disparaging those of whom it is said, but on the contrary, to establish so wise and just a Maxim, from the Authority of so regarded a People. If we are to admire and value the Germans for other Things, surely we ought not to pass by that Quality, which is most conspicuous in their Conduct; I mean their Patriotism, their strict, inviolable and most laudable Attachment to their own Country, at the Expence of all others; which though some designing Politicians may

may represent it as a narrow Bottom, is notwithstanding the only Bottom upon which true rational and invariable Policy can be founded. For as Self-Interest and Social, when strictly considered, are found to be the same, so if the Inhabitants of every Country would mind their own Interests, it is plain the Interest of the whole would be pursued; Providence having so ordered it, that each State looking to its own Concerns, shall produce not only Good to itself, but to its Neighbours; and therefore to quit this Principle is to quit our own Business, and entrench upon God Almighty's.

That the Inhabitants of Germany, have wisely, honestly, and virtuously preferred their Liberty and Independancy to all other Considerations; and for this Reason called in the Assistance of French, Swedes, Danes, and other Nations, in order to prevent their Freedom from being destroyed by the Ambition of the House of Austria. This Conduct of the Princes and States of Germany, brought about the Treaties of Westphalia, by which the Constitution of the Empire is settled, and the Ballance of Power therein legally, and effectually secured. From hence it has followed, that whatever our great Ministers might believe, or rather might endeavour to make this Nation believe, the Germans in general have always considered such Powers, as have supported the Authority of the House of Austria, as mistaking the true Interest of Germany; and inadvertently contributing to the altering that Ballance, which it was their own Interest, as well as the Interest of the Germans, to protect and preserve; because it is the Freedom of this Nation that makes it formidable to the French, and useful to its Allies. All which shews the Necessity of our distinguishing rightly as to the Ballance of Germany, if we mean in earnest to secure the Ballance of Europe; and from the Want of Care in this Particular, it has

been that our *Confederacies* have so indifferently succeeded; notwithstanding, that we had in *Reality*, as well as in *Appearance*, a *Power* on our side infinitely superior to that of *France*, if we had known how to use it, or rather how to judge rightly, of our own *Interest*, and those of the *Germans*.

That we have been absolutely mistaken in attributing one while to the *Weakness* of the *German Princes*, at another Time to their *Wickedness* and *Perfidy*, their not crushing the *French* in the two last general *Wars*; when in *Reality* they failed of Success, not through *Want* of *Power*, but *Want* of *Will*. They did not *Fancy*, as some People on this Side of the *Water* did, or at least pretended so to do, that their *Interests* were *Diametrical Opposite* to those of *France*; but they judged it requisite to leave such a *Strength* in that *Power*, as might for ever secure to them the *Advantages*, which by the *Assistance* of that *Power*, they had gained by the *Treaty* of *Westphalia*. This secret *Inclination* for *France*, which we were pleased to call by the infamous Name of *Treachery*, appeared to them in the *Light* of *Patriotism*; for they wisely distinguished between a blind *Fondness* for their *Country*, and a *Rational Concern* for their being *Free* in that *Country*. They hated the *French* heartily, so long as they had *Reason* to fear them, but they loved themselves too well to suffer this *Passion* so far to get the better of their *Understandings*, as by undoing *France*, to leave it in the *Power* of the then *Imperial Family*, to undo themselves. These were then, these ever will be the *Principles* of their *Conduct*, and if we have not *Penetration* enough to see it, or *Sense* enough to regulate our *Conduct* thereby, this will not alter their *Schemes*, though it may perhaps ruin us.

That the present *War* in *Germany* is a fresh *Proof* of the *Truth* of these *Maxims*, and is so far from proving

ving that the German Princes either are, or believe themselves, inferior to the Power of France, that it proves the direct contrary; for it is certain, that if they had imagined, the whole Power of the French Monarchy in any Degree equal to, much less far greater than, their own, they would never have suffered such mighty Armies to have entered their Country quietly. But it is plain they acted from quite another Motive, they made use of the French Power, to pull down that of which they were equally afraid, not doubting but when this was done, that they would have been able to have kept the French within proper Bounds; which from the foregoing Computation of the present Strength of Germany, and even from the Consequences of this War, calamitous as they are, I think it plainly appears they were. I do not pretend to say, that what the German Confederates did was just or right, but be that as it will, plain it is, that they were not at all mistaken; and that if France had carried her Point in Germany, she would rather have gratified her Pique to the House of Austria than have provided for her own Security; since destroying the Ballance of Power in Germany will be found whenever she comes to understand it rightly, to be no more her Interest than it is ours, upon which Foot alone the publick Tranquility must be again established.

That the present Situation of Things in Germany, is not so much the Effect of French Power, or French Intrigues, as of the Inclinations or rather Policy of the Princes and States of Germany, the House of Austria only excepted. Hence this Unanimity in electing the present Emperor, and their Zeal and Constancy in supporting him, though stript of his hereditary Dominions. If we consider the Thing in a different Light, that has no Manner of Effect on them; for if it had, the Diet would certainly have declared against France, after the Battle of Dettingen, when
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there was nothing wanting, but such a Declaration to have carried the War into the Heart of France. This enables us to make Sense of Colonel Mentzel's Declaration, and to account for the Inactivity of the Campaign, after so extraordinary a Piece. That Declaration was undoubtedly made, with a View to feel the Pulse of the Diet, and if that had beat high, the most vigorous Measures would certainly have been pursued; but as it did not, it became expedient, to say the Truth, it became necessary, to temporise, 'till a new Plan could be formed. But surely after having pushed Matters so far, as to be thoroughly convinced that we have neither Power enough to force, or Policy enough to persuade the Germanick Body, that all Things are to be sacrificed to the gratifying our Hatred or Fear of France, we ought in Time to turn our Thoughts homeward, in Order to take Care of our own Concerns.

Upon doing this, it plainly appears, from the same Lights of Reason and Experience,

That foreign Wars have been equally fatal to English Princes, and to the English Nation, and that however they may at some times contribute to raise the Reputation of either, they have in the End weakned the Power and destroyed the Happiness of both. This has been rendered clear from the History of various Reigns, shewn to be the Sense of our Kings, from their private Letters and publick Declarations, and proved to be the Sentiments of our Ancestors from the most authentick Records. On the other Hand, it has been as fully demonstrated, that a contrary Conduct has been the Source of the Wealth, Trade, and Influence of these Kingdoms, in the several Reigns which make the most shining Figures in our Chronicles, so that if we will either trust to the Opinions of our Ancestors, to the Evidence arising from Experience of past Times, or to our own Reason, we must be

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convinced, that Peace and a steady Regard to our own Interest, are the only Means by which our Liberties can be secured, our Trade extended, and our Authority, with Respect to our nearest Neighbours in particular, and all Europe in general, effectually established, and for ever maintained.

That whenever we have been drawn to depart from these Maxims, to gratify the Ambition of our Kings, or the Notions of our Ministers, we have been driven back to them by a Series of Misfortunes, which might have been easily foreseen, and of Consequence without Difficulty avoided. For in the Prosecution of such Views we have been made continually the Tools of others, not only without the least visible Advantage, but even to the manifest Prejudice of ourselves. This we have from Time to Time acknowledged, though we have as frequently relapsed, and upon every Relapse have been forced to recur to right Measures, by finding ourselves deceived in our Expectations, exhausted of our Treasure, and deserted by those for whom we were so unreasonably prodigal. Neither has this been our Case only, but the Case of every other Nation possessed with a Romantic Zeal for settling the Rights of Mankind, and of interfering with the Prerogative of Providence; which was so clear to that great and honest Statesman John de Witt, that he wisely laid it down, in his Maxims for the Conduct of the States of Holland, that this was a Point always to be avoided; nor does it appear at this Day that his Countrymen have forgot his Advice, which I speak to their Honour, as well as for the Instruction of ourselves.

That through these repeated Mistakes, we are at last fallen into such a Condition, that nothing but a settled Resolution of opening our Eyes at last, and of keeping them open, can save us from Ruin. Our Taxes are so high, that, according to the most moderate Computation, they amount to upwards of thirteen Shillings

in the Pound; which adds such an artificial Weight to the intrinsic Value of our Manufactures, as puts it in the Power of some of our Neighbours, particularly the Dutch and French, to undersell us, and out of the Power of most Foreign Nations to purchase them, if we were not undersold; such is the Case with respect to our Trade abroad. But in Regard to our Conduct at Home, Things are still in a much worse State. For on one Hand, our vast public Debt may be justly considered as a Fund for Idleness and Luxury, and an unnatural Method of making imaginary Wealth produce real Interest to the Destruction of private Credit, by which Means it becomes a dead Weight on Trade, while, on the other Hand, the Money raised for the Interest of this Debt is drawn from the Lands and Manufactures of this Kingdom; so that by the most preposterous Policy, that was ever introduced in any Nation, the Industrious are taxed to support the Idle, and those who labour hardest to get their Bread, are obliged to part with one third of that Bread, to such as will do nothing.

That as these Hardships would be grievous on any Nation, so in any trading Nation they are intollerable; since they light the Candle at both Ends, and consume us as fast as our bitterest Enemies can wish. For while they load our foreign Trade, they abate our domestick Industry, and as they prevent our getting Money if we could earn it, so they hinder us from earning it, if we could get it; the Proof of these Facts is obvious in the Progress made by foreign Nations, beating us out of our Trade, which they never could have done, if the Price of our Goods had not been raised through the Increase and Multiplicity of our Taxes; at the same Time, that through the Loss of Industry, and the mighty Progress of Luxury, our Manners have been most amazingly corrupted, and this Corruption has rendered it possible to keep us for many Years, in
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this untoward Situation, and must still keep us so, if there is not such a Portion of publick Spirit left amongst us, as being properly, I mean legally directed, may enable us to shake it off, and resume our old Virtues, together with the steady Pursuit of our own Interests.

That all Things considered, this Task, however arduous, must be undertaken, and that speedily, if we will escape final Destruction is certain; since it is evident, that we are already in such Circumstances, as to have Advocates for the public Debt, by which I mean raising Money by mortgaging the Credit of the Nation, equal in Strength to the Landed Interest; and by the Concurrence of Accidents, sometimes superior to them, as appeared in the defeating Sir John Barnard's three per Cent. Scheme. Because it is visible, that if we proceed in remitting abroad on any Pretence whatsoever, a larger Proportion of Wealth than is brought in by the Ballance of Trade, we must necessarily beggar ourselves to enrich and support our Allies. Because we are drawn into this from a fallacious Appearance of Riches, which arises from the very Strength of Paper Credit, and which will be found fallacious only, if we continue to export our Cash and Bullion, the Continuance of which amongst us is the sole Means of supporting it; because the Truth and Certainty of all that has been said may be put out of doubt, by considering this undeniable Fact, that at a Time when Rents are every where falling, the Poors Rate every where increasing, and the Customs daily diminishing, a Handful of Jews, who never employ'd five Hands at Home, in any other Way than administering to our Luxury, and who never exported any Thing abroad, except perhaps our Coin, are able to lend the Public Millions,———If this is not a Demonstration that Industry and Trade are sinking, and that nothing can save us, but a timely Inter-

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position of Frugality and Publick Spirit, I think Sceptism ought to take Place of Reason in Politicks, as it has already done of Authority in Religion.

I have now performed all I promised, and supplied the candid and impartial Reader, to the best of my power, with all the Lights, that are necessary, to enable him to judge sensibly of the present State of Affairs, of the Conduct hitherto pursued, the Conduct we should have pursued, and the Conduct we ought still to pursue, for our own Benefit, and the Security of our Neighbours. I have laid down nothing without assigning Reasons, and supporting those Reasons by the Evidence of Facts; and I have at the same Time avoided, with the utmost Care, whatever might seem to carry the least Appearance of Personal Reflection. In handling this Subject, and in handling it in this Manner, I have had the Satisfaction of that Part of my Countrymen in view, who have no other Expectations from the pursuit of political Measures, but what must follow from the Rectitude of those Measures; for I knew well enough, before I set Pen to Paper, that such as have an Interest in carrying on a tedious and uncertain War upon the Continent, were never to be satisfied, that is, so long as they are in their present Situation, for it is idle to argue against Interest; he who is thoroughly possessed with it shuts his Ears to Reason.

But however these Men may dislike, and declaim against this Work at present; I am pretty confident, that when by a pursuit of their own Measures, if they are permitted to pursue them, their Situations are changed, and they come to be possessed of large Properties, they will then alter their Sentiments, reject their former Plan, and espouse mine. This being a Fact, I can only
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render it probable by shewing that I have Experience on my Side. Many of those who espoused the Cause of War vigorously in the Days of *Queen Anne*, and in the Beginning of the late Reign shewed, or pretended to shew, the utmost Zeal for hanging up those who brought about a Peace, became afterwards, when such a Change as I before mentioned had happened in their own Circumstances, as warm Advocates for pacifick Measures. I do not say this with any View of blaming them for this Change in their Conduct, for let Men have gone Wrong ever so long, it is always laudable for them to go right at last; and if to their Care of preserving Peace, they had joined an assiduous Application to the promoting Trade, reducing the publick Debt, and lessening our Taxes, they had most certainly prevented the present Disputes; for it is an unquestionable Truth, and they have themselves owned it, that nothing but the embarrassed State of *Great-Britain*, could encourage *France* to resume her ambitious Designs, or inspire her with any probable Hopes of carrying them into Execution.

If therefore this be true, and there be generally speaking such a Repugnancy between the Interests of *Great Britain* and the Interest of *France*, while this Thirst of Dominion governs her Councils, it is plain, that to secure ourselves, and to thwart them, the only Method left in our power, is to act with the greatest Oeconomy at Home, and to avoid entering into such Measures abroad, as must oblige us to be at such an Expence, as will necessarily subject us, not only to our present Load of Debts and Taxes, but to a much greater. If it should be objected that the present apparent Wealth of this Nation, our great Plenty of Plate Jewels, and other valuable Effects, and the

great Quantity of Specie that circulates seems to shew that there is no Weight in these Arguments, and that we are still in a Condition to carry on our Share of a general War, without any Danger of Ruin, I must beg leave to offer the following Particulars to the Consideration of such as believe there is any Weight in this Objection. That this is a Matter not capable of the necessary Proof, I mean such a Proof as is requisite to support the Objection; for Wealth in particular Hands, or Wealth in particular Places, is no certain Sign of the general Riches of a Country, but rather the contrary; and I desire that every sensible Man would examine, and reflect, whether Plate, Jewels, and valuable Effects, are more conspicuous in the Houses of Traders, Manufacturers Farmers, and such like industrious People, who cannot enrich themselves, without enriching the Nation, or whether they are in the Hands of another Sort of People, who may, who indeed must grow rich, by the Pursuit of Measures beneficial to themselves, however destructive to the Nation. That all this Shew of Wealth depends intirely upon our publick Credit, while that subsists we must preserve it, if that should fail this must vanish. A Man deeply in Debt, may have his House richly furnished, but if his Creditors fall upon him, he who had yesterday a Cupboard of Plate, may to-morrow want an Earthen Cup for his Small-Beer. That it is not impossible our very Specie may be owing to our publick Debts, for while all *Europe* is in Confusion, while we are raising Money upon Interest, and the publick Faith of this Nation is regarded (as I hope it ever will) as an indubitable Security, it is highly probable that our Neighbours, while they are possessed of any Money, will send it over hither, in order

order to make the most of it, and at the same Time have it in a Place of Security, which will at once account for the keeping up of our Stocks, notwithstanding our entering into a War, and our finding Money for the Maintenance of that War, though from the Want of a Ballance of Trade in our Favour, we might be otherwise incapable of supplying it. But what will all this end in? If we should be press'd for our Debts, is it possible for us to pay them, when we cannot raise Money for the Service of the current Year, without running many Millions in Debt? If on the other Hand, the publick Creditors should be contented with receiving only the Interest of their Debts, as they stand at present, must this Country be for ever mortgaged, must ourselves, and our Posterity, live not only without Ease, but without Hope? Let these Particulars I say be considered, and then let the Objection have all the Weight that it deserves. I do not labour to establish a System, but to come at the Truth.

It is with the same View to Truth, that I incline to consider this Point in another Light, that is, on a Supposition that the Fact on which the Objection is grounded may be true. I will suppose, agreeable thereto, that Plate, Jewels, Pictures, Furniture, and whatever else a Spirit of Luxury requires for its Gratification, abound amongst us more at present, than in any other Period of Time; nay, I will go still further, and suppose, as such as make the Objection do, that in Point of Manufactures, Shipping and Trade, we are in a Condition much superior to our Ancestors. Yet what of all this? If we are truly rich, we act as if we were miserably poor, and if we continue to do so, we must become really poor. We have for thirty Years last past, raised as much upon
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the People, to pay the Interest of the publick Debt, as if properly applied would have defrayed the current Service of the Year. Let any honest sensible Man lay his Hand upon his Heart, and say whether it is wise and honest to raise upon the People just as much again as there is any Occasion for. If we are really rich, why are we in Debt? Whose Interest is it to keep us in this Situation, to anticipate our Funds, and to apply that to the Payment of Interest, which if raised in a proper Time, and appropriated to proper Purposes, would have kept us from paying Interest at all? If we are really poor, so poor as that it is necessary for us to run in Debt, as a Nation, for the current Service of the Year, that is for what is requisite to support our Government; why do we boast our Riches, or why do we pursue such a Conduct, as must draw us into so vast an Expence, as if we were really rich, must sooner or later render us poor.

These are Questions that any Man who thinks a little must be tempted to ask, and they are Questions that the ablest of our Politicians, let him think as long as he will, can never answer to any reasonable Man's Satisfaction.

But if all that has been said should go for nothing, if we must lay aside all Thoughts of our own Affairs, all Concern for our own Condition, all Regard for the Fate of our Posterity, in order to secure the Ballance of Power, and preserve Things from going to Wreck on the Continent; I say if this be all we have to think of, let us know why, to what Purpose, and how long we are to think of this. I have already shewn, that with Respect to the Interest of *Great-Britain*, we have generally speaking run into great Mistakes, about the Ballance of Power, and by running into these
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Mistakes, have never been able to attain our End, how right soever our Intention might have been, if we could have obtained it : and I have shewn that our late Measures have been grounded on the same Mistake that ruined us formerly. If it be said that we must fulfil our Treaties, shew us those Treaties, and let us know what we are to fulfil. It cannot surely be thought reasonable, that we should assist the Queen of *Hungary*, *totis viribus*, before the *Dutch* are under the same Obligation. Let us always act the Part of just and faithful Allies, but let us not always act the Part of Principals in every Quarrel ; let us not take upon us a greater Share, than if we were Principals it would become us to take ; let us not do our own Parts, and at the same time pay other Powers for doing theirs. Above all let us know what is to be done. We have been told by great Authority that we might, last Campaign, have hurt the *French* more if we would ; let us hear the Reasons why we did not, let us know who we are to hurt, or whether we are to hurt any Body next Campaign. Let us know what will content us, and whether having that, will not create a new War. The Queen of *Hungary* gave up *Silesia* to the King of *Prussia* ; she now holds *Bavaria* as an equivalent for *Silesia*. Let us know if the King of *Prussia* is content with that, or whether if she quits this Equivalent, he will concur in procuring her another ; if not, what are we doing ? If she must set down at last without an Equivalent, because the *German* Princes and States would think her too powerful if she had one, why should not Things be now adjusted on the best Terms possible, without running us into any further Expence ? In the two last Wars we had some Rules to go by, why should we not have some Rule in this ? These
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are Questions fit to be asked, and fit to be answered; since it is most evident, that if we go on, but a very few Years, at the Rate we have done for some Years past, the Event must be fatal to us, whatever becomes of the Ballance of Power.

As I have all along made it my Business to avoid invidious Topicks, so I have been particularly careful not to enter into the present Grand Dispute, about the Expediency of employing *Hanoverian* Troops. It is very natural for Princes to have a warm Affection for their hereditary Subjects, and such as they conceive particularly bound to them by the Ties not only of Duty, but Affection. This was the Case of the Emperor *Charles V.* who preferring his Countrymen, the *Flemings*, to the highest Offices civil and military, provoked a Rebellion in *Spain*, the suppressing of which proved the Ruin of the *Spanish* Liberties. A strong Partiality in Favour of their Arch-Ducal Subjects, was no less fatal to the *German* Branch of the *Austrian* Line, for while they treated the *Hungarians* as Vassals, and the *Bobemians* as Slaves, they were in reality Masters of neither; but on the contrary, strong Instances of a certain and eternal Truth, that excessive Dominion instead of being the Source, is in reality the Bane of Power; which further appears by the mighty Stand made by the Queen of *Hungary*, not in Virtue of her Authority over the Bodies, but of her Influence over the Minds of her Subjects. Partiality of the same Nature proved very destructive to our *James I.* who was extravagantly fond of his *Scottish* Countrymen, by which he lost the Hearts of his *English* Subjects, and scattered those Seeds of Discontent, which afterwards grew up into a Harvest of Rebellion. Yet it must be allowed, that there is on the other Hand, very strong

strong Prejudices in the Subjects of the same Prince against each other, which ought to be considered, as well as that Partiality, which is always natural, and sometimes laudable. The greatest Misfortune of all, and that against which every free People ought to guard most, is the Treachery of some of themselves, who may endeavour to make court to the Humour of their Prince, at the Expence of his Interests and those of the Nation. Such Men will make use of a thousand specious Pretences, supported by a sounding, noisy, obstreperous Eloquence; such Men will affect to seem what they are least; and put on the Air of Patriots, that they may accomplish the Work of Parricides. In respect to such Men what shall we do? Why let us follow the Advice of *St. Peter*, that we may avoid the Snares which they lay for us, and the Slavery into which they would bring us: For he saith, *Beware of those, who while they promise LIBERTY are themselves the Servants of CORRUPTION: For of whom a Man is overcome, i. e. deceived or bribed of the same he is brought into BONDAGE.*



POSTSCRIPT.

THERE are some People who are still enamour'd of the old System of *German* Politicks, and therefore would fain persuade us, that the Face of Things is entirely chang'd; that since the Elevation of the Grand Duke of *Tuscany* to the Imperial Dignity; we have the Emperor and Empire entirely with us, the whole Weight of the *Germanick* Body, acting in Favour of the House of *Austria*, and consequently most of those Difficulties removed, which are set forth in the foregoing Pages, and they have gone so far, as with an Air of Insult and Pride, to say they wished to hear what the Author of this Treatise could say to the contrary; which because I am loth to have *Fugam fecit* impressed upon my Grave-Stone, I am ready to comply with, and for the Reader's Ease and my own, shall digest what I have to say upon this Subject into very few Words.

In the first Place then, I deny the Premises; and in the second, I declare I am not satisfied as to the Conclusion; that is in express Terms, and in plain *English*, I do not think that it is so clear, that by the new Election, the whole Weight of the Empire will be brought to act in Favour of
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the House of *Austria* ; or supposing the Thing so to be, it is not at all clear to me, that even in this Case, we ought to resume the old System, and suffer ourselves to relapse into following *German*, rather than *British* Politicks. How far I have Reason, and, which is even a stronger Thing, Facts on my Side, is what I am to shew, and this, as I promised, shall be done very succinctly.

The Election of the Grand Duke, however it might be consider'd elsewhere, was indubitably consider'd in *Germany*, as the most effectual Means of restoring the Peace and Tranquility of that Country, a Thing of infinite Importance to its Inhabitants, and which therefore they had a right to consider before all Things. Yet as simple, as self-evident as this Proposition may seem, it is a Fact notorious to all the World, that the Members of the *Germanick* Body did not fall into it with that Unanimity, or pursue it with that Zeal and Resolution that might have been expected ; on the contrary a great deal of Pains were necessary, and a great deal of Pains were taken to bring this Measure about ; and I think, without Injury to Truth it may be affirmed, that there was not a single Power that had any influence in this Business, but what expected and received Gratification, and Satisfaction as to their particular Interests, before they concurred in it ; from whence I infer, that what the great Friends of *German* Politicks boast of here, as the Effects of publick Spirit, and magnify as a noble Effort of *German* Patriotism, was in reality, and at the Bottom no more than the Result of an aggregate Body of private Views, united to bring about this Point, by those who had taken upon themselves to be the Curators of *Germany*, if I may be allowed the Expression, and to oblige the Princes and States of

that Country by lucrative Motives to pursue their own Good.

But after all that was done, or that could be done in this Respect, this Project was brought to bear in a very imperfect Manner, for the Event is not so old, but that it may be well remember'd; this famous Election was not unanimous, and was so far from answering the Purpose at first, that it actually heighten'd the Flame of War, and for a Time increased the Distresses of *Germany*; before this necessary Unanimity could be produced. On the one Hand the Imperial Court was inflexible; no Terms were to be granted to the King of *Prussia*; no Relaxation given to the Elector *Palatine*; and on the other, neither of those Powers were to be frighted, even by the powerful Confederacy of *Warsaw*, into giving their Consent to the Election, till they had a Compensation, or a Consideration for giving that Consent. The bad Consequences of this Conduct on both Sides, which for the present defeated all the great and good Designs, it was expected the Election should have brought about; appearing plainly no Pains were spared to make the Parties concern'd, sensible of all this, and to bring about by fair Means an Event so necessary to their private as well as publick Interests; but in vain; for tho' *Prussia* listen'd to our Reasons, yet at *Vienna* they were rejected; and a much greater stress laid on the Heroism of Prince *Charles*, than on the Mediation of *Great-Britain*.

In the mean Time the common Cause suffer'd on every Side, and in the severest Degree. In *Italy*, the common Enemy shut up the King of *Sardinia* in his Capital; in the *Low-Countries*, the *French* after penetrating the Barrier, took Winter-Quarters at the Gates of *Brussels*; and a Rebel-

Rebellion was set on Foot here, that put it out of our Power to mind any Body's Concerns but our own. These were the blessed Effects of the War in *Silesia*, and the first Fruits of that Firmness shewn by the Imperial Court, for pursuing what she took to be her own Interest; while in Consequence of the Election, a kind of Neutrality took Place upon the *Rhine*; which at once satisfied the Ministers of *Vienna*, and serv'd the Purposes of the Ministry at *Versailles*. Let any Man deny these Facts that can, and let any Man who owns them say, what good accrued to the common Cause, by the Emperor's Election, before the Peace of *Dresden*.

That Peace was entirely owing, first to the Success, and next to the Moderation of the King of *Prussia*. He enter'd into a Convention with us, upon Terms that were thought fit for him, when threatned by a powerful Confederacy, and oblig'd to trust the Safety of his Capital to its own Militia. He was content with these Terms, when he treated a new Peace in the Capital of one of those Powers, who rejected those Terms, and eclips'd the Reputation of his Arms by the Readiness with which he laid them down. The whole Affair was finished in three Days; in the first, he appear'd the greatest Soldier; in the second, the ablest Statesman; in the last, the truest Patriot that *Germany* has seen. To him we owe the giving the last Sanction to the Election, and the putting the Affairs of *Germany* on that Foot, upon which they stand at present, and what that is, we are bound next to enquire.

That the Emperor is acknowledg'd by all the Princes and States of *Germany*, is true; that there is an Army of Observation, such as it is, is likewise true; but that the Empire still continues
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Neuter, and is disposed so to continue, is as true. If *France* should content herself with being upon the Defensive in the next Campaign, I dare prophecy, that the Troops of the Empire will neither be brought to pass the *Rhine*, nor to act in Conjunction with the *Imperialists* if they should pass it; so that all Hopes of a Diversion on that Side; are very indifferently founded; and we know by Experience, that unless *France* is attacked on all Sides, it signifies very little to attack her on any Side; and if she can make Terms in *Italy*, the Allies will not be able to do any great Matter on the only Side which will then lie open. So that upon a serious Review of this Matter, it appears the Election may have been a right Measure in *German* Politicks, as it gives Peace and Quiet to that Country; but hitherto it cannot be said to have given any great Weight to the common Cause, or procured any great Assistance to the House of *Austria*.

The *Hanoverians* that are in *Flanders*, are there independant of that Election; the *Hessians* in our Service are likewise independant of that Election; when the *Saxons* shall march, it will be upon Terms independant of that Election; and even the Troops of the Bishop of *Bamberg* and *Wurtzburg*, are in the Pay of the *Dutch* independant of that Election. On the other hand, the King of *Prussia* is arming with a View not known; the Elector *Palatine* is arming with a View that is very much suspected; the Duke of *Wirtemburgh* has refused to march his Contingent, so much as to awe the *French*; and the Operations of the Troops of the Circles, are yet under Deliberation, and will be so after the Campaign begins. What then becomes of the Weight of *Germany*, where is the Accession of new Allies to the common Cause, or to the Sup-
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port of the House of *Austria*.² Let him who knows it speak.

But now to the second Point, let us take it for granted, since undoubtedly it can never be proved, that we shall have the Emperor and Empire in the remaining Part of the War on our Side. Have we not had them before, and have they ever acted at their own Expence? Will any Advantage accrue to the common Cause, from stilling the *Austrian Troops Imperial*? If not, what have we got: They could not march before, till they were put in Motion by the Maritime Powers, and they tell us from the *Hague*, that this is the Case now. The *Dutch* say that they advanced a round Sum themselves, nay, and that they forc'd other People to advance Money too, before General *Grune* could move a Step, though *Brussels* was besieged; which was taken, almost as soon as the Subsidies produced the Motion of the *Imperialists*. If, therefore, after all, the Emperor and the Empire must be paid by the Maritime Powers for doing their own Business, we may be said to have augmented our Auxiliaries; but not surely to have increased the Number of our Allies; and with Respect to Auxiliaries, the Maritime Powers had more than they could well pay before. Thus then, the very expensive Measure of the Election has put us, upon this Supposition, into a way of being at a still greater Expence, if we will have it do us any good, and this is the plain *English* of making a Push; raising vast Supplies at once, and bringing all the Iron of *Germany* into the Field—in Exchange for *British* Gold—if it could be had.

This is a fair and true Representation of the Matter, a Draught of *German* Politicks after the Life; this is that great Scheme, which our short-lived

lived Ministry was to have undertaken; this is that Scheme which will be boasted of as certain and infallible, if it had been pursued, and this in fine, I think I have demonstrated to be as wild and as impracticable a Scheme as the former. And therefore I shall conclude, with gratifying my Enemies so far, as to concur with them in Opinion, that the Second Edition of *German Politics*, is not only as bad, but much worse than the First; and may the Guardian Genius of GREAT-BRITAIN, defend us from ever seeing a Third.

F I N I S.



